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French and British Colonial Legacies in Education: 
Evidence from the Partition of Cameroon 
Abstract. Cameroon was partitioned between France and the UK after World War I 
and then reunited after independence. I use this natural experiment to investigate 
colonial legacies in education, using a border discontinuity analysis of historical 
census microdata from 1976. I find that men born in the decades following partition 
had, all else equal, one more year of schooling if they were born in the British part. 
This positive British effect disappeared after 1950, as the French increased education 
expenditure, and because of favoritism in school supply towards the Francophone side 
after reunification. Using 2005 census microdata, I find that the British advantage 
resurfaced more recently: Cameroonians born after 1970 are more likely to finish 
high school, go to university and have a high-skilled occupation if they were born 
in the former British part. I explain this result by the legacy of high grade repetition 
rates in the French-speaking education system and their detrimental effect on 
dropout. 
 
JEL classification: N37, I25, H52, O43. 
Keywords: Education, colonization, persistence, border discontinuity, Africa. 
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Despite the mounting evidence of the importance of history for economic development, the 
precise mechanisms linking colonial history to contemporary outcomes need to be better 
understood. Particularly widespread is the idea that former British colonies are more prosperous 
because of the institutions and culture they inherited from Britain (Landes, 1998; North, 1989; La 
Porta et al., 1998, 1999), or because of better education (Grier, 1999; Woodberry, 2004; 
Cogneau and Moradi, 2014). Cameroon was divided between the British and the French after 
World War I and reunited in 1961. This has created a unique natural experiment to study the 
legacies of different colonizers holding present-day national institutions constant, thus focusing on 
local level mechanisms behind colonial legacies. Using a border discontinuity analysis of 
geolocated population census microdata, I study the variation over time of colonial legacies in 
Cameroon. 
This paper focuses on education, which historians and economists have identified as a key 
aspect of the relatively more favorable nature of British colonial rule in Africa. British colonial 
education relied on Christian missions which sought to convert as many people as possible, 
taught in local languages and employed many African teachers. The French, by contrast, regulated 
teachers’ qualifications and schools’ curricula, and imposed French as the only language of 
instruction. In the French colonies of Africa, the government became the main provider of 
education, but it targeted only a small segment of the population (Gifford and Weiskel, 1971; 
Woodberry, 2004; Garnier and Schafer, 2006; Cogneau and Moradi, 2014). Primary enrollment 
rates were higher in British Africa (Benavot and Riddle, 1988). Differences in education could 
still be observed around 2000 (Brown, 2000; Cogneau, 2003; Garnier and Schafer, 2006), and 
Grier (1999) argued that they could account for differences in economic growth between former 
French and British colonies. 
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Two problems arise when trying to understand whether and how the identity of the colonizer 
shaped the development path of African countries. First, British and French former colonies are 
not directly comparable: Britain colonized regions that were richer, and where missionary presence 
was more important (Cogneau, 2003; Frankema, 2012). Second, it is a challenge to identify the 
mechanisms of causality from colonial institutions or policies to present-day outcomes (Nunn, 
2009). 
Researchers working on the persistence of human capital shocks propose several mechanisms. 
Glaeser et al. (2004) and Brown (2000) propose a national level mechanism where colonial 
education shapes national political institutions, which in turn affect economic development and 
education. Others put forward persistence in education demand, because of inter-generational 
transmission of preferences (Wantchekon et al., 2015; Cagé and Rueda, 2016), often through 
religious conversion (Woodberry, 2004; Nunn, 2010). Huillery (2009) proposes a local 
mechanism of persistence in supply where fixed costs create a path dependency in the location 
of schools. The last mechanism is persistence in pedagogical culture and practices — Garnier 
and Schafer (2006) talk of “educational model”, Woodberry (2004) of “teaching style”. In 
particular, the practice of having students repeat a grade if they are deemed insufficiently 
proficient (a practice much more prevalent in former French colonies than in former British 
colonies) is described as raising dropout rates and preventing countries from increasing primary and 
secondary completion rates (Bernard et al., 2005; Ndaruhutse et al., 2008; Majgaard and Mingat, 
2012). 
The unique history of Cameroon allows me to tackle the problem of causal identification and 
restrict the number of potential mechanisms of persistence. After World War I, German 
Cameroon was divided between France and the United Kingdom under a mandate of the League 
of Nations. The two parts were ruled as colonies (British Cameroon became part of colonial 
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Nigeria) until independence in 1960. In 1961, after a plebiscite, the southern part of British 
Cameroon was reunited with French-speaking Cameroon. 
I take advantage of this history to identify the causal effects of colonizer identity on 
education. I use a spatial discontinuity analysis, relying on the local arbitrariness of the border 
between French and British Cameroon. Near the border, the fact that a given village fell on the 
French or British side at the time of partition was quasi-random. This follows a recent literature 
using African borders as natural experiments. As noted by McCauley and Posner (2015), in 
these experiments, the treatment and control groups, once separated, continue following different 
paths, and have different post-colonial experiences, making it hard to identify mechanisms of 
persistence. Cameroon offers the unique example of two regions ruled by different colonizers but 
then reunited after independence. In this setting I can test for the importance of local level 
mechanisms of persistence. 
Using 1976 census microdata, I show that men of school age after partition had, all else 
being equal, one more year of schooling if they were born on the British side of the border. This 
positive British effect completely disappeared for those of school age in the last decade of 
colonization and beginning of independence. Using 2005 census microdata, I find that the 
discontinuity in education, if anything, favored the Francophone side for cohorts of school age in 
the 1960s and 1970s, but that the Anglophone advantage re-emerged more recently: people born 
in the former British part after 1970 are about 8 percentage points more likely to complete high 
school, and more likely to have a high-skilled occupation. 
To explore the demand and supply mechanisms that might explain these results, I start by 
estimating a border discontinuity in a housing-quality based wealth index in 1976. Household 
heads born on the British side of the border had, all else being equal, better quality housing. 
Decomposing the index into various components, I estimate a strong discontinuity in public goods 
provided locally, like piped water, suggesting better local institutions in former British Cameroon, 
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but no discontinuity in a private wealth index excluding public utilities. I then present new data 
on colonial public finances in British and French Cameroon and use recent administrative data 
on the universe of schools in Cameroon with their date of construction to estimate border 
discontinuities in the supply of schools over the 20th century. This evidence suggests that 
colonial education policies played a role in the emergence of a discontinuity in education after 
partition, and that the convergence in education after 1945 was explained by a surge in education 
expenditure on the French side in the last decade of colonization, followed by a school supply 
policy favoring the Francophone side after independence. 
In 2005, I estimate no difference at the border in a housing-quality based wealth index, in 
night-time light per capita or in industrialization, but I find that the Francophone side is more 
urbanized. To explain the re-emergence of a positive Anglophone effect in education, I propose 
and test for the mechanism of legacies in pedagogical culture, more specifically the widespread 
use of grade repetition in former French Cameroon and its detrimental effect on school dropout 
rates. Students born in Francophone Cameroon are 20 percentage points more likely to have 
repeated at least a grade, and the border discontinuity in secondary school completion falls to 
zero when controlling for district-level repetition rates. 
This paper contributes to the literature on the historical determinants of economic 
development and the impact of colonizer identity (North, 1989; Landes, 1998; La Porta et al., 
1998, 1999). The “history matters” literature has sometimes been accused of “compressing 
history” (Austin, 2008), relating an event in the past to an event in the present, but leaving 
unexplained the complex causal chain running from then to now. I can track the variation in 
colonial legacies over time using cohort analysis and focus on local level mechanisms of 
persistence, holding national-level institutions constant, thanks to Cameroon’s unique history. 
This paper also adds to the literature that uses African borders as natural experiments 
(McCauley and Posner, 2015, for a review). Cogneau and Moradi (2014) study the partition of 
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German Togo between the British and the French. They find that the two parts started diverging 
after partition and that the divergence persisted, but in contrast with Cameroon, the two parts of 
Togo belonged to different countries after independence. Lee and Schultz (2012) also study the 
border between former French and British Cameroon, using present-day survey data, and find 
that households located in the former British part have higher wealth and better access to piped 
water, which they attribute to the legacy of indirect rule and better local institutions. Ali et al. 
(forthcoming) also use survey data to confirm the greater importance of chiefs in Anglophone 
countries in general and in Cameroon in particular. The data used in these studies do not allow 
the authors to study the time variation in historical legacies, nor to take selective migration into 
account. Knowing the place of birth of respondents as well as their place of residence, I show that 
taking selective migration into account by comparing people born close to the border rather than 
living close to the border can seriously reduce estimated discontinuities in education or wealth. 
Finally, this paper contributes to the debate on the merits of grade repetition (Jacob and 
Lefgren, 2009; Manacorda, 2012), particularly relevant in Africa, where the percentage of 
students repeating a grade is high (Bernard et al., 2005; Ndaruhutse et al., 2008). This paper is 
the first to provide evidence of the causal link between French colonization and high repetition 
rates. It also provides some evidence that high repetition rates can decrease high-school 
completion rates and, as a result, the percentage of high-skilled workers. 
Historical background 
Before the 19th century, European presence in Cameroon remained coastal and devoted 
to slave trade. Despite the presence of British missions from the mid-19th century on, the region 
fell under German influence and became the colony of Kamerun in 1884. During World War I, 
it was invaded by the British and the French and divided into two administrative regions in 
1916. The border between the two zones was decided hastily. Negotiations over the division of 
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Cameroon were part of broader negotiations over the future of German colonies in Africa. 
Because the British had their eyes on other German colonies1, they allowed the French to get “most 
of the spoils” in Cameroon (Louis, 1967). The division was confirmed in 1919 (with a few 
modifications) and, in 1922, the two zones became mandates of the League of Nations: the 
British part was attached to Nigeria, while the French part became the protectorate of Cameroun 
(Louis, 1967; Brownlie, 1979; Ngoh, 1987) — see figure 1. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
In Cameroon, as in other regions of Africa, British and French colonization differed in 
education and institutions. Christian missions, both Protestant and Catholic, were active in 
German Cameroon and remained the main provider of education in both parts after partition. The 
two colonizers differed, however, in the incentives they set up for missions to provide formal 
education. 
The British colonial government inspected mission schools and subsidized them on the basis 
of efficiency (Fonkeng, 2007; Fafunwa, 1974), while the French colonial government turned a blind 
eye to the large private, missionary sector, leaving it mostly unsupervized and unsubsidized 
(Fonkeng, 2007; France, Ministère des Colonies, 1921–1938).2 
In British Cameroon, all mission schools were inspected by supervisors under government 
control, and the most efficient ones, representing 7.5% of all mission schools in 1938, were 
subsidized (Fafunwa, 1974; Fajana, 1978; Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1938).3 Government 
                                                 
1 German East Africa, German Southwest Africa, and Togoland. 
2 This is an important difference with Togo, where private schools had to close down if they did not respect 
the colonial government’s requirements (Cogneau and Moradi, 2014). 
3 There were two types of private schools: assisted schools, which received subsidies, and unassisted 
schools, which did not. From 1926 on, both were registered and inspected by supervisors under government control 
(Fafunwa, 1974). 
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control was more extensive, but less stringent than in French Cameroon. There, very few mission 
schools were recognized by the government and could receive subsidies (3% of the total number 
of mission schools in 1938), but the ones that were had to meet a demanding list of requirements in 
terms of teachers’ qualifications, curriculum, and the language of instruction — teaching in French 
was mandatory (France, Ministère des Colonies, 1921,1938). Subsidies were more generous in 
British Cameroon: in 1937, subsidies to private schools represented 68% of the subsidized schools’ 
wage bill in British Cameroon versus 19% in French Cameroon.4 
Both colonizers invested in a small public education sector. It was more decentralized in 
British Cameroon, where public schools were often run by native administrations (local 
governments empowered by indirect rule).5 
In Cameroon, like elsewhere in Africa, the French and the British set up a dual legal system 
where “traditional” rules coexisted with a formal legal system copied from the colonizing 
country: a common-law system in British Cameroon and a civil-law system in French Cameroon. 
Early studies underlined another institutional difference between the two colonizers: while the 
French favored centralized colonial administration — direct rule, the British relied on local 
“traditional” authorities — indirect rule (Mair, 1936; Perham, 1967). However, historians have 
stressed that, within each empire, colonial administration differed by geography and by time 
period. In Cameroon, according to Geschiere (1993), the British and the French wavered about 
                                                 
4 My calculations, from Great Britain, Colonial Office (1937), France, Ministère des Colonies (1937), and 
Cameroun (1937). In French Cameroon, I assume mission school teachers were paid the same wage as African 
teachers in the public sector. 
5 In both French and British mandated territories, education policies completely neglected the predominantly 
Muslim North, which is not studied in this paper because the northern part of English-speaking Cameroon was not 
reunited with French-speaking Cameroon after independence. 
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their policies towards traditional authorities but, on balance, chiefs seem to have gained more 
legitimacy under British rule than under French rule. 
Finally, the two colonizers differed in their attitude towards forced labor. The German labor 
tax of 30 days a year was abolished by the new colonizers, but the French rapidly reintroduced a 
labor tax of 10 days a year, and used conscripted paid labor to build railways, subjecting laborers 
to harsh working conditions (Le Vine, 1964; Buell, 1928). There was no evidence of forced labor 
in British Cameroon. Plantations in British Cameroon were sold back to their former German 
owners soon after World War I and attracted many wage workers from Nigeria and French 
Cameroon (Le Vine, 1964). 
In Africa, colonial policies changed markedly in the last fifteen years of colonization, a 
period characterized as the era of “developmental colonialism” by Cooper (2002). As colonization 
was increasingly questioned from within and without, Britain stressed the need for self-
government, while France sought ways to assimilate its colonial empire into a large French 
polity. In Cameroon, the French abolished forced labor and established some representative 
institutions. In Nigeria, of which British Cameroon was a part, the British gradually introduced 
self-government and federalism (Ngoh, 2001). Both colonizers started transferring funds to their 
African colonies for large infrastructure projects. Internal revenue also increased, and public 
expenditure per capita, including education expenditure, boomed (Cogneau et al., 2018). 
In French Cameroon, the transition to independence was far from peaceful: in 1955, the 
French government disbanded the UPC (Union des Populations du Cameroun), an independence 
party created in 1948, which also sought reunification of Cameroon within its German borders. An 
armed struggle began, taking place mostly in French Cameroon in regions close to the border 
with British Cameroon. The deadliest operations hit the Bamiléké region between 1959 and 1961 
(Deltombe et al., 2011). In 1960, France granted independence to the pro-French Ahmadou 
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Ahidjo, Cameroon’s first president, who continued fighting the rebels with help from the French 
army until 1971. 
Nigeria also became independent in 1960. Since the 1940s, political parties in French 
Cameroon and in Nigeria had been demanding reunification of the two territories (Ngoh, 1987; 
Deltombe et al., 2011). In 1961, a referendum was organized in British Cameroon: while the 
North voted to remain part of Nigeria, the Southern part voted to be reunited with former French 
Cameroon, as shown in figure 1. In this paper, I consider only the part of the border between 
French and British Cameroon that is today an internal border in Cameroon. 
At first, the former British part retained some autonomy within the Federal Republic of 
Cameroon, but in 1972, the federation was replaced with a unitary state. However, present-day 
Cameroon stands out for the duality of its judicial and education systems. In primary and 
secondary education, two separate school systems coexist: Francophone and Anglophone students 
prepare for different end-of-cycle examinations. Yet, there is a single higher education system 
(World Bank, 2003). Cameroon has two official languages, French and English, but Anglophones 
are a minority (a fifth of total population) in a predominantly Francophone country. Both presidents 
Cameroon has had since independence (Paul Biya succeeded Ahmadou Ahidjo in 1982) were born 
in the former French part, and inhabitants of the former British part have long felt disadvantaged 
by the Francophone center.6 
Data 
The paper’s main results are estimated using Cameroonian population censuses, which 
provide enough statistical power to focus on geographic units located within a very short distance of 
the border. The data also allow me to consider heterogeneous effects across cohorts to provide a 
                                                 
6 Protests to defend the Anglophone specificity, notably in the education and judicial systems, began in 
October 2016 and have since turned into a violent conflict. 
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time-varying view of French and British comparative legacies in education. I use the full 1976 
Cameroonian census (more than 7 million individuals in total) and a 10 % nationally representative 
extract of the most recent census (2005). 
I geolocated the 1976 census down to the village level. Figure 2 shows the very dense 
spatial distribution of villages in the border region. However, in a big part of the Francophone 
Ouest region, geolocation of 1976 data at the village level is impossible (dashed area on figure 
2). The 2005 census data cannot be geolocated more precisely than the district level, which still 
gives a reasonable degree of geographic variation (121 districts within 100 km of the border with 
an average surface area of 740 km2, see online appendix figure B.2). 
 [FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Because individuals rarely go back to primary school in adulthood, education variables 
give information about the education system during the time an individual was of schooling age.7 
This allows me to identify the effect of colonizer identity on education in different periods by 
looking at different age groups within a census, provided I show that results are not explained by 
differences in mortality rates by education levels across the border (selective mortality). To mitigate 
the problem of age heaping, I focus on 10-year cohorts around ages ending in 0.8 The online data 
                                                 
7 There was variability in school entry age and cycle length in colonial period, especially in mission schools. 
In 1976, official school entry age was 6, and the primary cycle lasted 7 years in Anglophone Cameroon and 6 years 
in Francophone Cameroon. However, intermittent schooling and late school entry were widespread: in the 1976 
population census, 40% of children in the last year of primary school were over 15. 
8 Age heaping is the tendency for people who do not know their exact date of birth to report attractive age 
figures such as ones ending in 5 and 0 (A’Hearn et al., 2009). It is important in the 1976 and 2005 population 
censuses of Cameroon, as can be seen on online appendix figures B.1. People who misreport their age are likely 
to be less educated, so that age heaping effectively sorts people, concentrating the less educated at round ages. Because 
age heaping is more pronounced in Anglophone Cameroon (systematic registering of birth was more widespread in the 
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appendix describes in more detail the variables contained in the census data and used in the 
analysis. 
To undertake balance tests at the border, I use a variety of geographic datasets, as well as data 
on the location of German schools in 1911. I collected historical public finance data and recent 
administrative school data to help understand mechanisms underlying the results. All these 
sources are described in more detail in the online data appendix. 
Identification strategy 
Local randomness of the border 
I use a border discontinuity analysis to identify the causal impact of colonizer identity on 
education outcomes over the 20th century. My identifying assumption is that, when it was drawn, 
the border between the two parts of Cameroon was locally random. That is, it did not coincide 
with an existing political, linguistic, or ecological division. According to Alfred Milner, 
representing the United Kingdom at the Paris Peace conference in 1919, the boundaries between 
the two spheres of occupations “cut across tribal and administrative divisions, [took] no account 
of economic conditions and [were], in every way, objectionable” (Louis, 1967; Lee and Schultz, 
2012).9 
                                                 
French part), the difference in education outcomes between former British and former French Cameroon is biased 
downwards at round ages (and upwards at other ages). 
9 Some changes were made to the 1916 border in 1919, but they were minor. For instance, the area forming 
the present-day Bamboutos departement was administered by the British between 1916 and 1919, but it was given 
to the French in 1919 (Tsoata, 1999). This reorganization did not change the fact that the border cut across the 
Bamileke ethnic group. In any case, this part of the border is not used in the main specification because of missing 
data problems — see figure 2. 
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The border was not drawn as a straight line. It mainly followed small rivers and watersheds 
(Brownlie, 1979), displayed on figure 3. Geographic or ethnic considerations were not taken into 
account, with one exception: the declaration refers to “the tribal boundary between Bansso and 
Bamum” (Brownlie, 1979, p. 567). 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 3 superimposes the border on Murdock’s (1959) tribal map. Online appendix 
figure B.3 replicates this exercise using postcolonial ethnographic data. These maps confirm 
that the border cuts across ethnolinguistic groups in the south. In the north, however it seems to 
respect ethnolinguistic boundaries, in particular the boundaries of the Bamun (or Mum) ethnic 
group. King Njoya, king of the Bamun (or Bamum) from 1883 to 1931, converted to Islam 
together with his court, invented a system of writing, the Shumom script, and had a school built 
to teach it (Tardits, 1980). Because this history might have influenced the supply and demand of 
education, I never use the section of the border corresponding to the Bamun kingdom in the 
analysis (section 4 on figure 2). Additionally, the border analysis controls for ethnic homeland 
fixed effects. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 1 presents balance tests on geographic variables, using 10 × 10 pixel-level data 
(columns 1 to 3), the 1976 data geolocated at the village level (columns 4 to 6), and the 2005 data 
geolocated at the district level (columns 7 to 9). Discontinuities are obtained using the same 
specification and samples as for the main results of the paper.10 
 [FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
I also run balance tests on the number of German schools prior to partition, using data on 
German mission schools from Schlunk (1914), which are described in the online data appendix. 
Figure 4 displays the spatial location of schools in German Cameroon in 1911, five years before 
                                                 
10 In column 3, the unit of observation is the pixel. Columns 6 and 9 run the same regression as in the rest 
of the paper, but replacing the outcome of interest by geographic variables at the village and district level. 
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partition. The density of schools is very comparable on both sides of the future border. Table C.1 
in the online appendix shows that there is no border discontinuity in the density of German 
schools in 1911. 
Migration 
Migration is one of the major concerns threatening the validity of a border discontinuity 
analysis. Cross-border migration can be thought of as a problem of non-compliance, as 
individuals assigned to one treatment (one colonizer) change treatment by moving to the other part. 
Migration away from the border region can be thought of as a problem of attrition, as individuals 
leave the sample (McCauley and Posner, 2015). In most border discontinuity designs, the 
researcher observes the place of residence of individuals at the time of enumeration, not the place 
of residence at the time of treatment. 
Cameroonian population censuses give the district of birth of individuals, so that the 
problems created by migration are largely tempered under the reasonable assumption that most 
people are schooled in their district of birth. In 2005, I use variation at the district level. The 
1976 population census gives the village of residence and the district of birth, but not the village 
of birth. To use variation at the village level, I assume that individuals still living in their district 
of birth never moved and were born in their 1976 village of residence. To avoid the problem of 
selective attrition created by migration, I randomly repatriate each migrant in a village of their 
district of birth, weighting the probability to be from a given village by its (non-migrant) 
population — which means I assume constant migration rates across villages of the same 
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district.11 To check the sensitivity of my results to this way of reallocating migrants, I also 
present discontinuities estimated on the sample of non-migrants only. 
Even when the place of birth of individuals is known, potential selective migration of the 
parents is a concern. It might be that individuals with a particular preference for educating their 
children moved to one side of the border or the other after partition. If these population 
movements were important, we should observe a jump at the border in the density of individuals 
born after partition. Figure C.1 in the online appendix displays McCrary tests for the absence 
of border discontinuity in the density of villages and individuals (McCrary, 2008). The top 
panel plots the number of villages in bins of 500 meters on either side of the border along with 
a local linear polynomial fit and displays the associated discontinuity estimate. The bottom panel 
does the same for the density of men born between 1922 and 1931, in the decade following 
partition.12There is no border discontinuity in the density of either villages or individuals. 
Though the absence of density discontinuity is reassuring, migration could still bias the 
results on education if different types of selective migration compensated each other. Section D.5 
in the online appendix tries to assess the biases introduced by various types of cross-border and 
internal migration, as well as migration from Cameroon to Nigeria after reunification, and 
concludes that they are unlikely to affect results very much. 
                                                 
11 There are enough observations in the dataset for the law of large numbers to apply: results are remarkably 
robust to different iterations of the repatriation procedure. Repatriated migrants represent 14% of total population 
in the cohort born between 1882 and 1891, and up to 42% in the cohort born between 1942 and 1951. 
12 Similar results are obtained for the other cohorts. 
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Econometric specification 
To obtain border discontinuities, which I interpret as the causal effect of having been 
colonized by the British rather than the French, I estimate the following equation 
                  𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏𝐵𝑅𝑗 + 𝑓(geographic location𝑗) + 𝑥𝑗
′𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗   (1) 
where 𝑠𝑖𝑗 is the variable of interest for individual 𝑖 born in village 𝑗; 𝐵𝑅𝑗 is a binary 
equal to 1 if village 𝑗 lies on the British side of the border; 𝑓(geographic location𝑗) is a 
function of geographic location of village 𝑗; 𝑥𝑗 is a vector of ethnic homeland fixed effects. 
Cameroonian censuses do not give ethnicity, so that ethnic fixed effects are not at the individual 
level, but at the village level — a village j is attributed ethnicity 𝑒 if it falls in the ethnic 
homeland of ethnicity e on Murdock’s (1959) map. In 2005, geolocation at the village level is 
impossible: 𝑗 indexes districts, and I use the geographic location of the district’s centroid. Because 
districts can cut across several homelands, I do not control for ethnic homeland fixed effects, but 
I ensure that I do not compare districts close to the border but very far away from each other by 
controlling for border section dummies.13 The coefficient of interest is τ : it measures the 
discontinuity at the border, and is positive when it favors the British side. To study time variations 
in colonial legacies, I estimate equation (1) separately for different 10-year cohorts.  
I control for the smooth effects of geographic location using a local linear non-parametric 
function of distance to the border, with a triangular kernel and mean squared error (MSE) 
                                                 
13 A dummy for districts close to section 3 on figure 2, and a dummy for districts close to section 4 for 
discontinuities estimated on the whole border. Results are robust to other definitions of the border section 
dummies, for example dividing the border into 5 segments of equal length. 
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bandwidth (Cattaneo et al., 2018).14 I also show the robustness of my results to specifications 
controlling for geographic location with a polynomial in longitude  𝑥𝑗 and latitude 𝑦𝑗, similar to 
Dell (2010). Standard errors are clustered by the unit of geolocation (village or district), and I also 
present the robust non-parametric confidence interval proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). 
I exclude from the sample villages close to Douala, the main port and economic capital of 
Cameroon, lying very close to the border on the French-speaking side (border section 1 on figure 
2). I also exclude villages on either side of the northern border section (section 4 on figure 2), 
which is not plausibly exogenous as it respected the boundaries of the Bamun kingdom. In the 
end, because villages cannot be geolocated in part of the Ouest region, I estimate village-level 
discontinuities on border section 2 on figure 2.  District-level results are obtained on a sample 
excluding the northernmost border section and Douala (online appendix figure B.2). Section 
D.6 in the online appendix assesses the comparability of results obtained on different border 
sections and using a different type of geographical variation (villages versus districts). 
                                                 
14 This amounts to restricting the sample to observations within ℎ km of the border and controlling for a 
linear function of distance to the border 𝑑𝑗 whose slope is allowed to vary on either side, and weighting each 
observation by (1 − |𝑑𝑗/ℎ|). ℎ is determined in a data driven way by seeking to minimize the mean squared error 
of the estimator. The algorithm to determine the optimal bandwidth is performed on the sample of all individuals 
born within 100 km of the border in order not to over-represent the much larger French side. The British side is about 
100 km wide. Similarly, when working on district centroids, the provinces of North and Extreme-North, very far 
away from the border region and which have no British counterpart, are excluded. 
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Results 
Colonial period results: cohort analysis of 1976 census data 
I start by presenting discontinuities in male education estimated cohort by cohort on 1976 
census data geolocated at the village level.15 Men born between 1912 and 1941 and who were of 
school age in the 30 years following partition had, all else being equal, about one more year of 
schooling if they were born on the British side of the border (figure 5). The positive British effect 
vanishes in the late colonial period: it is close to zero and not statistically significant for cohorts 
born after 1942. One might be surprised that the estimated discontinuity is positive and significant 
for the cohort born 1902–1911, but the youngest members of this cohort were 5 in 1916, when 
Cameroon was divided into two zones of occupation, and 8 in 1919 when it was officially 
partitioned. Because of errors in reporting age (see online appendix figure B.1), many of them 
were likely younger. Because of late school entry and intermittent schooling, the majority of 
this cohort was actually young enough to be in primary school in 1919.16 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 decomposes the British effect on years of schooling into the different margins of 
school participation, and primary and secondary cycle completion. Men born between 1922 and 
1931 were 12.9 percentage points more likely to enroll in school if they were born on the British 
side of the border and 10.2 percentage points more likely to complete a primary cycle. They 
were 1.3 percentage points more likely to complete a secondary cycle (first panel of table 2). Men 
                                                 
15 Because very few girls attended school before the 1950s on both sides of the border, estimated 
discontinuities for female education are small and no statistically significant, and are not presented here. 
16 Late school entry and intermittent schooling were very widespread, as evidenced by the attempts of 
colonial administrators at curtailing the phenomenon — both the 1926 Education Ordinance in Nigeria and the 
1920 decree regulating private schools in French Cameroon contained regulation regarding the age of students in 
primary school. In the 1976 population census, 40% of children in the last year of primary school were over 15. 
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born between 1942 and 1951 were not more likely to have been to school or to have 
completed primary, but they were 5.9 percentage points more likely to have completed 
secondary school if they were born on the British side of the border (second panel of table 
2).17 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Two types of selection problems might bias the estimation of the British effect: selection by 
mortality and selective migration. The problem of selection by mortality would occur if there 
were differences in mortality rates by education level across the border — colonial period results 
are obtained on individuals observed in 1976, when they were in their 40s and 60s. Online 
appendix D.4 estimates discontinuities in the share of each cohort in total population and shows 
that selection by mortality is unlikely to explain the results. Selective cross-border and internal 
migration might also bias the results, for example if parents with a preference for educating their 
children migrated from French to British Cameroon after partition, or migrated within French 
Cameroon away from the border region.18 Online appendix D.5 uses the 1976 census to 
document patterns of migration in the border region and estimate upper bounds for the biases 
they could create. Migrants from French to British Cameroon born before 1912 were not more 
educated than locals; those who migrated away from the border region in French Cameroon were 
indeed more educated than those who stayed, but this would account for a difference of at most 
0.25 years of schooling at the border in the cohorts born just after partition. Online appendix 
                                                 
17 In the online appendix, figure D.1 shows visual representations of the discontinuities in education, table 
D.1 shows that results are robust to parametric latitude-longitude specifications, and figure D.2 displays the 
distribution of discontinuities obtained on placebo borders running parallel to the actual border but shifted East or 
West. 
18 McCrary tests already show the absence of jump in density across the border, but migration flows in 
opposite directions might compensate each other. 
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D.5 also shows results obtained without repatriating migrants in their village of birth and simply 
considering those who never migrated: the only significant difference is that the British effect 
does not fall to zero for the cohorts of school age in the late colonial period, because migration 
selected away the most educated in these cohorts. Finally, online appendix D.5 discusses the 
potential biases introduced by the migration of Nigerians to British Cameroon during the 
colonial period and their departure after reunification. 
Because observations cannot be geolocated below the district level in the 2005 census, 
results for more recent cohorts use geographical variation at the district rather than the village 
level. To ensure the comparability of 1976 and 2005 results, online appendix D.6 replicates the 
village-level results using district level variation. 
Present-day legacies: analysis of 2005 census data 
I now present discontinuities in education estimated on 2005 census data geolocated at the 
district level.19 Figure 6 displays cohort by cohort discontinuities in years of schooling, school 
participation, primary and secondary school completion. Like with 1976 census data, I estimate a 
positive and statistically significant British effect on years of schooling and school participation 
for the cohort born between 1921 and 1931.20 The effect disappears for cohorts of school age in 
the 1940s and 1950s. Perhaps a sign of discrimination in school supply in a Francophone majority 
country, individuals born after 1961 are more likely to have been in school and have completed a 
primary cycle if they were born on the Francophone side of the border. Estimated discontinuities 
                                                 
19 Because enrollment of women started increasing after World War II, I now consider both men and 
women. Focusing only on men, as in 1976, yields qualitatively similar results. 
20 The effect is smaller for primary and secondary school completion, but the 95% confidence interval 
includes the 1976 results and it is worth noting that the cohort born 1921–1930, whose members are older than 75 
in 2005, is very small. 
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in school participation and primary completion are large (more than 10 percentage points in the 
1950s and 1960s), but not statistically significant at conventional levels, and become smaller 
over time. What is remarkable is the resurgence of an Anglophone advantage in recent cohorts, 
driven by higher rates of secondary school completion on the Anglophone side of the border. 
Individuals born in the 1970s and in the 1980s are about 10 percentage points more likely to have 
completed a secondary cycle if they were born on the Anglophone side of the border. 
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
For the sake of space, more detailed results are presented only for the 1971–1980 and 1981–
1990 cohorts in table 3. For these cohorts, the advantage of the Anglophone system lies in its 
capacity to retain students in school longer. The discontinuity in school participation and 
primary school completion is actually negative, favoring the Francophone side, for the cohort born 
1971–1980, though it is (barely) statistically significant for school participation only. The two 
sides of the border appear to have converged in school participation and primary completion for 
the cohort born 1981–1990 (table 3, columns 1 and 2). However, individuals of both cohorts born 
in Anglophone Cameroon are more likely to have completed secondary school and have some 
years of higher education. The estimated discontinuity in secondary school completion is 9.5 
percentage points for the cohort born 1971–1980 and 7.6 percentage points for the cohort born 
1981–1990 (column 3). The estimated discontinuity in the probability to have at least 3 years of 
higher education is 10.5 percentage points for the cohort born 1971–1980 and 2.5 percentage 
points for the cohort born 1981–1990 (column 4).21 
The Anglophone advantage is not only manifest in attainment levels, but also in actual 
years spent in school (taking into account repetition and differences in the length of the primary 
cycle, see online data appendix). Individuals born in Anglophone Cameroon are about 10 
percentage points more likely to have spent 15 years in school or more (table 3, column 5). 
                                                 
21 The majority of individuals in this cohort are still too young to be in university. 
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Students in Anglophone Cameroon do not attain higher levels of schooling because passing from 
one grade to the next is easier (something we might suspect because of differences in repetition 
rates): they actually spend more years in school. Furthermore, those who work are more likely to 
have a high-skilled occupation: the discontinuity of 1.3 percentage points is statistically 
significant at the 10% level for the cohort born 1981–1990 (column 6). This indicates that these 
education differences have labor market effects.22 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Discussion of mechanisms 
I will now examine the mechanisms that can explain the main results of the paper. The 
multiplicity of treatments coming with the assignment to French or British Cameroon (policy, 
institutional, and cultural) means that there is no perfect tool to pin down mechanisms exactly; 
instead, one has to rely on carefully weighing competing explanations (McCauley and Posner, 
2015). I first consider the mechanisms behind the divergence and convergence in education 
during the colonial period, broadly distinguishing between demand and supply channels. I 
estimate border discontinuities in a wealth index in 1976, present newly collected data on the 
financing of education in British and French Cameroon, and use recent administrative data on the 
universe of schools in Cameroon to estimate discontinuities in school supply over the 20th 
century. I conclude that supply policies played an important role in the evolution of differences in 
education at the border. I then turn to the mechanisms explaining the resurgence of an Anglophone 
advantage in education. I estimate border discontinuities in various measures of economic 
                                                 
22 In the online appendix, figure E.1 shows a visual representation of the discontinuity in secondary school 
completion and higher education; figure E.2 displays the spatial variation in education variables in the border 
region; table E.1 shows that results are robust to parametric latitude-longitude specifications; table E.2 shows the 
robustness of results to considering the whole border, including the northern section where the Bamun kingdom 
lies (the only difference is that the Anglophone effect is now also positive for school participation and primary 
school completion for the cohort born 1981–1990; figure E.3 displays the distribution of discontinuities in 
secondary school completion estimated on placebo borders. 
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development in 2005, as well as discontinuities in secondary school supply and in the share of students 
repeating a grade. I propose that Anglophone Cameroonians are, in 2005, more likely to finish 
high school and go to university because the practice of grade repetition in the Francophone system 
fosters dropout and limits secondary school completion. Lastly, I undertake mediation analysis to 
provide evidence for this mechanism. 
Explaining divergence and convergence at the border 
How did colonizer identity affect education levels? Mechanisms explaining the 
divergence and convergence in education at the border can be broadly grouped into demand and 
supply channels. Comparatively better economic conditions under British rule could have increased 
the demand for education through an income effect or higher returns to education. There is no 
precisely geolocated data on economic development during the colonial period, but a wealth 
index can be built from data on housing quality in the 1976 population census to assess differences 
in economic development at the border. Of course, these differences could have emerged in the 
postcolonial period, and they could be the consequence of better education in British Cameroon, 
but the exercise is still informative.23 I estimate a large discontinuity in household wealth of 0.83 
standard deviations favoring the former British side in 1976 (table 4, top panel, column 1). 
However, part of this effect might be explained by selective migration away from the border 
region. One concern is that, on the French side of the border, richer and more educated 
individuals migrated to the administrative capital Yaounde or the economic capital Douala. In the 
                                                 
23 Contrary to human capital, which is measured at the individual level and accumulated primarily in 
childhood, housing-quality based wealth is measured at the household level and accumulated throughout the life 
cycle. It is therefore not suited for a cohort analysis. In any case, I attempted the exercise (by cohort of the 
household head), but results (not reported here) are inconclusive: there is no clear trend and the British effect 
appears homogenous across cohorts. 
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bottom panel of table 4, I allocate the wealth index to the household head and estimate a 
discontinuity controlling for the location of the place of birth of the household head rather than his 
place of residence. The effect is divided by more than two, which confirms that migration is a 
serious concern, but it remains important at 0.31 standard deviations (table 4, bottom panel, 
column 1). 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
To have a better idea of the mechanisms behind a higher wealth index on the British side of 
the border, columns (2) and (3) of table 4 decompose the wealth result into a public and a private 
wealth index. The public index uses housing quality variables that are strongly dependent on 
public utilities, like water or light source, while the private index excludes them.24 When I 
control for the location of the place of birth of the household head rather than place of residence, 
I find that the discontinuity in the wealth index is entirely driven by public wealth. Next, I 
distinguish between a utility provided locally, piped water, and a public utility provided nationally, 
electricity (columns 4 and 5). Only access to piped water increases when one crosses the border 
from French to British Cameroon. One likely mechanism, proposed by Lee and Schultz (2012), 
is that British indirect rule resulted in better local institutions. However, from the limited 
measure I have, these better local institutions do not seem to have increased private wealth.25 
                                                 
24 See online data appendix for the components of the wealth indices. 
25 One specific explanation for the divergence between the French and the British part is the higher wages 
offered by German-owned plantations in British Cameroon (Le Vine, 1964). In online appendix table F.1, I estimate 
the discontinuity in years of schooling for men born between 1922 and 1931, controlling for dummy variables 
indicating whether the village of birth lies within 5, 10, and 15 km of a German plantation on the British side. 
Though the proximity to a plantation correlates with education, the estimated discontinuity hardly changes when 
these controls are added. 
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The divergence in education could also be explained by supply mechanisms, that is by 
the direct effect of education policies.26 In Cameroon, like elsewhere in Africa, the British colonial 
government gave incentives for religious missions to provide formal education through a system 
of subsidies. Though religious education played a more important role in French Cameroon than 
elsewhere in French Africa, Christian education did not receive as much support in French 
Cameroon as in British Cameroon. Built using newly collected public finance data (see online 
data appendix), table 5 shows that, in the 1930s, the British spent more per capita than the French on 
education. Education expenditure was, however, low in both parts. In 1937, the British colonial 
government in Cameroon was spending 1.33 1913 shillings (about 2018 $10) per school age child, 
while the French colonial government was spending 0.49 1913 shillings (about 2018 $3). Subsidies 
for private education were 6 times higher in British Cameroon than in French Cameroon (0.18 
versus 0.03 1913 shillings per school age child). These differences reflect differences in education 
policies rather than differences in fiscal capacity. Indeed, though education expenditure per capita 
was higher in British Cameroon, total government expenditure per capita was lower than in 
French Cameroon, which means that the share of education in total government expenditure was 
higher (7.71% vs 2.37% in 1937). 
 [TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
It is important to stress that British colonial education policies relied heavily on local actors. 
Public education was, on the British side, largely delegated to native administrations, local 
                                                 
26 We also need to consider the possibility that the divergence in education at the border had nothing to do 
with colonial policies or institutions. It would be the case if the border cut French Cameroon from important 
infrastructure or markets, decreasing average income and the demand for education, as well as tax revenue, public 
expenditure and the supply of education, or if British Cameroon became part of a much richer colony. This scenario 
is, however, not realistic: most of the infrastructure fell on the French side of the border, notably the port of Douala 
and the main railways.  British Cameroon became part of Nigeria, not a particularly rich colony, and was largely 
neglected by the British colonial government (Ngoh, 2001). 
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governments empowered by indirect rule. The British government also relied extensively on 
Christian missions.27 To show that different colonial policies regarding missions had an impact on 
religious conversion, I estimate discontinuities in religion in the 2005 census in online appendix 
table F.2. In 2005, Cameroonians were 18.4 percentage points more likely to be Christian and 
14.6 percentage points less likely to have no religion if they were born on the Anglophone side of 
the border. The discontinuity in Christianity is largely driven by a discontinuity in the percentage 
of Protestants. We therefore need to consider another type of demand mechanism, involving non 
labor market returns to education: Protestantism encourages personal reading of the Bible, which 
can increase the demand for education (Woodberry, 2004; Becker and Woessmann, 2009).  
The British advantage in education was quickly erased starting after World War II, at the 
same time as education policies were changing on the other side of the border. In the 1950s, 
public expenditure increased in both parts of Cameroon, but the surge was particularly 
pronounced in French Cameroon: total expenditure per capita was multiplied by 6 between 1937 and 
1955, and education expenditure per capita was multiplied by 20 (table 5, columns 5 and 6). In 
1955, French Cameroon was spending 3 times more than British Cameroon on education, and it 
had even surpassed the British side in subsidies to private schools (last column of table 5). 
Though the change in education expenditure started before independence and reunification, 
post-colonial developments reinforced the convergence in education between both sides of the 
border, and even resulted in a Francophone advantage for cohorts born after 1960. Since 
reunification, inhabitants of the former British part have felt discriminated against by the Francophone 
center. I provide some evidence that school supply policies since independence have disadvantaged 
Anglophone Cameroon. 
                                                 
27 In the predominantly Muslim North of British Cameroon (today part of Nigeria), where missionary 
presence was limited for religious and political reasons, enrollment rates were very low during the colonial period. 
They were also very low in the predominantly Muslim Northern part of French Cameroon.  
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 [FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 7 plots border discontinuities in the number of schools per 100 children every 5 
years between 1900 and 2000. Because historical data on the location of schools is not available, 
I use 2003 administrative data giving the date of opening of every school in Cameroon. 
Therefore, I do not observe schools that closed between their opening and 2003. If attrition was 
selective with respect to colonial origins, this would introduce a bias in the estimation of border 
discontinuities. The 20th century was a period of high population growth and primary schooling 
expansion in Cameroon, so that massive closing down of public schools is unlikely.28 Turnover of 
schools might be more important for private schools, and it might be more important in British 
Cameroon, where local actors had more autonomy in education. Lastly, the bias introduced by 
selective attrition should be stronger in the colonial period than in recent times, as schools had 
more time to close down and disappear from the sample. Overall, selective attrition might lead to 
an underestimation of the British effect during the colonial period. 
The number of primary schools per children starts diverging in 1930, the positive British 
effect reaching 0.27 schools per 100 school age children in 1950 (7, panel 1). The British effect 
then decreases to zero between 1950 and 1965, and inverts after independence before reverting 
back to zero in the 1990s. The third and fourth panels of figure 7 distinguish between public and 
private schools: the advantage of the Francophone side after independence is entirely explained by 
public schools: the discontinuity in the number of public primary schools per children reaches 
−0.2 in the 1970s. This is consistent with discrimination of the Francophone government 
against the Anglophone part after independence, and might explain why primary completion 
rates are lower in Anglophone Cameroon for the cohorts born in the 1960s and 1970s (figure 6 
and table 3).  
                                                 
28 Cameroon’s population was multiplied by 5 during the 20th century and gross primary enrollment rates 
increased from less than 1% to more than 100% (Benavot and Riddle, 1988). 
29  
Re-emergence of an Anglophone advantage: the legacy of pedagogical culture 
If the initial divergence in education was erased by the boom in education spending in 
French Cameroon starting at the end of the colonial period and favoritism towards the 
Francophone part after reunification, what then explains why individuals born in the 1970s and 
1980s in former British Cameroon were more likely to finish high school and go to university? 
Here again, mechanisms can be broadly divided into supply and demand. With respect to 
demand mechanisms, individuals born in former British Cameroon might be more likely to 
finish high school and pursue tertiary education because the returns to tertiary education are 
higher. Table 6 estimates discontinuities in wealth and in various measures of economic 
development in the 2005 census. Whether I control for the geographic location of the household 
head’s place of residence or place of birth (panel A), I estimate no statistically significant 
discontinuity in the housing-quality based wealth index.29 In panel B, I look at three district-level 
measures of economic development — night-time light per capita, urbanization, and the share of 
workers in the industrial sector. I estimate no discontinuity in night light or industrialization, but I 
estimate a strong discontinuity in urbanization favoring the Francophone side (−29 percentage 
points).30 These results make it unlikely that the Anglophone advantage re-emerged because of 
differences in economic development affecting the demand for education. At the same time, 
these results seem to indicate that the Anglophone advantage in higher education has no effect on 
                                                 
29 These results are not in contradiction with Lee and Schultz (2012), who use 2004 survey data and find 
that households located on the former British side have higher wealth. I also estimate a positive discontinuity in 
wealth at the border, but I do not have the statistical power to reject that it is equal to zero. However, the sign of 
the discontinuity (still not significant) inverses when I control for the location of the place of birth of the household 
head, which might be an indication that selective migration plays a role in the results of Lee and Schultz (2012). 
30 Though urbanization is often used as a proxy for economic development, it need not necessarily mean 
that economic conditions are better in Francophone Cameroon, as it could simply reflect a stronger urban bias — 
policies biased towards urban areas (Lipton, 1977; Bates, 1981). 
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economic development, but it is important to note here that it is a recent phenomenon affecting 
only cohorts born after 1970 (figure 6, panel 4), who were younger than 35 in 2005. It is likely that 
the effects of the difference in education did not have time to materialize in such a short period. 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Demand for higher education might also be different because of differences in preferences, 
explained by culture, especially religious factors and the inter-generational transmission of 
educational preferences. The share of Protestants was higher in Anglophone Cameroon in 2005 
(appendix table F.2). However, the positive effect of Protestantism on education is generally 
explained by the necessity to be able to read the Bible. This is at odds with the finding that the 
British advantage appears only in high school completion and university participation, and not in 
primary school, where children typically learn to read. 
Inter-generational transmission of education might be another channel. Migration from 
the border region was more important on the Francophone side of the border (see online appendix 
D.5). If migration selected away the most educated individuals on the Francophone side of the 
border, inter-generational transmission of education could explain the resurgence of a British 
advantage in education for children born close to the border in the 1970s and 1980s. This 
explanation, however, fails to explain why rates of primary school completion tend to be higher 
in Francophone Cameroon while rates of secondary education are much lower. 
With respect to the education supply channel, neither the supply of primary schools nor the supply 
of secondary schools favored Anglophone Cameroon in the end of the 20th century (figure 7). The border 
discontinuity in the number of secondary schools per school-age child actually favored Francophone Cameroon 
in 2000 (panel 2). Pedagogical culture, though, is likely to differ between two sub-systems with 
very different colonial histories. 
Grade repetition (or grade retention) is much more common today in France than in other 
OECD countries (OECD, 2012). In Africa,  the average repetition rate,  one  of the highest in 
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the world, is brought up by former French colonies (Ndaruhutse et al., 2008).31 The merits of 
grade repetition  as a pedagogical tool are heavily debated, but recent research provides well 
identified evidence  of its detrimental effect on school dropout in the United States and Uruguay 
(Jacob and Lefgren, 2009; Manacorda, 2012). Grade repetition discourages students and sends 
them a signal of low ability, which encourages them to leave school early. In Manacorda’s (2012) 
study of Uruguay, grade failure is associated with a lower educational attainment of −0.8 school 
years. 
Rates of grade repetition are today much higher in former French Cameroon and jump 
discontinuously at the border. From the 2005 census, I build a measure of grade repetition for 
students still enrolled in school (primary and secondary). A student is considered to have repeated 
a grade if they are older than what their normal progression through the system would predict, 
taking into account average school entry age in each district (see online data appendix). Students 
are 20 percentage points more likely to have repeated at least a grade if they were born in 
Francophone Cameroon (table 7, column 1). 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Two reasons might explain why students repeat more grades in the Francophone system: 
either, as argued by Bernard et al. (2005) or Ndaruhutse et al. (2008) for Francophone Africa as 
a whole, pedagogical practices differ, or they are similar, but students in the Francophone system 
have lower learning outcomes, because of some other difference between the two systems, so that 
they do not have the required level to move to the next grade. The only measure of learning 
outcomes in the 2005 census is the ability to read and write (asked only for individuals older 
than 12). Columns (2) and (3) of table 7 show that students’ performance, measured as the ability 
of 12-year-old students to read and write, is not lower in the French system. Column (4) estimates 
a border discontinuity in repetition controlling for the ability to read and write (for children still 
                                                 
31 Around 2002, primary school repetition rates averaged 22.5% in former French colonies versus 9.5% in 
former British colonies. 
32  
in school older than 12). Though illiteracy is a very strong predictor of the probability of having 
repeated a grade, the estimated discontinuity in repetition remain very large, at 17 percentage 
points. 
To disentangle the different mechanisms of persistence, I use mediation analysis, studying 
what happens to the treatment effect (the border discontinuity in secondary school completion) 
when controlling for plausible mediating variables.32 Because my measure of grade repetition is 
obtained from students still in school in the 2005 census, I focus on the youngest cohort, born 
1981–1990. I proxy for the district-level repetition rate to which this cohort was exposed using 
the repetition rate of students still in middle school in 2005, defined as above. Grade repetition 
is a combination of a policy variable (the extent to which schools are using grade repetition as a 
pedagogical tool) and an individual variable (the learning outcomes of a student). I am interested 
in measuring the policy variable, so I add district level literacy rates in the cohort 1981–1990 as 
a control. I also consider as a likely mediating variable of the Anglophone effect the number of 
secondary schools in 2000, the wealth and education of cohorts born 1951–1960 (the parents), 
religion, and urbanization rates at the district level. Table 8 shows that controlling for district-
level rates of grade repetition causes the border discontinuity in secondary school completion to 
fall to zero (columns 8 and 9), while controlling for other mediating variables hardly affects the 
estimated discontinuity of 8 percentage points. Though the results of this mediation exercise are 
to be interpreted with caution, they provide evidence in favor of the pedagogical culture channel 
and the role of grade repetition. 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
How could pedagogical culture, a fixed characteristic of the Francophone education system, 
have different effects over time? Why were individuals born in the 1940s, for example, not more 
likely to complete a secondary cycle in the Anglophone system? A first explanation is that the 
                                                 
32 On mediation analysis and the assumptions needed, see Imai et al. (2011) and Heckman and Pinto (2015). 
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favoritism towards the Francophone side in primary school supply seems to have decreased in 
the end of the 20th century, making apparent the positive effect of lower repetition rates in the 
Anglophone system. The third panel of figure 7 shows that the public supply of primary schools 
strongly favored the French-speaking side of the border in the 1960s and 1970s, but that there 
was no more discontinuity at the border in the 1990s. 
Another potential explanation lies in the overall increase in average years of schooling. Within 
25 km of the border, average years of schooling went from less than 4 for people born in the 1940s 
to 8.5 for people born in the 1970s Though in the Francophone system, repetition rates are high in 
both the primary and the secondary cycle33, the effect of grade repetition on dropout is likely to be 
more important for older students because they have a higher opportunity cost of staying in school 
— they could start working. A student who repeats the first year of primary school is more likely 
to remain in school than a student who repeats the first year of secondary school. Though I do not 
have data on historical repetition rates, we have no reason to believe that they were lower in the 
1950s and 1960s than they are today. However, it is likely that their discouraging effect did not 
matter as much because the number of children going on to secondary education was low. 
The education system inherited from the British colonizer seems more efficient at 
retaining children in school and allow them to pursue higher education, but what are the 
implications in terms of welfare? If returns to one year of education are higher on the 
Francophone side of the border, then it might be that the Francophone system, though providing 
fewer years of effective education, is actually giving students a similar set of skills. Answering 
this question fully requires detailed work on teaching quality in the two systems, which is left for 
future research, but two things must be emphasized here. The first is that the Anglophone 
advantage is not only manifest in attainment levels, but also in numbers of years spent in school, 
                                                 
33 In 2002–2003, the percentage of students repeating a grade in the Francophone system was 28% in 
primary school and 19% in secondary school. 
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taking repetition into account (table 3, column 5). The second is that the probability of having a 
high-skilled occupation is higher in Anglophone Cameroon (table 3 column 6 and online 
appendix table E.1) — it appears that differences in rates of secondary school completion have 
labor market effects. 
Conclusion 
How does the history of Cameroon help us understand the mechanisms of persistence of 
colonial legacies, notably the respective roles of local and national-level mechanisms? The 
important lessons here are that colonial legacies are not set in stone and that national-level 
policies play a major role. The initial divergence in education at the border was short lived, 
because of a boom in education expenditure on the French side in the very last decade of 
colonization, and because of favoritism towards the Francophone side after reunification. 
This is not to say that colonial history does not matter. First, British and French 
colonization left very different cultural legacies: people born in former British Cameroon are today 
far more likely to identify as Christian, while people born in former French Cameroon are far 
more likely to say they have no religion. Moreover, the educational advantage of the British part 
resurfaced more recently. To explain it, I put forward the channel of different pedagogical 
practices — another cultural legacy. Though more research is needed, the French legacy of high 
repetition rates is not limited to Cameroon and concerns Francophone Africa as a whole. Efforts 
to lower grade repetition rates in Francophone education systems might help decrease the 
dropout rate and allow more students to finish high school and go to university. 
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Table 1 – Absence of geographical discontinuities across the border 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 10x10 km pixels 1976 village-level sample 2005 district-level sample 
 Mean within 
30 km 
 Mean within  
15 km 
 Mean within  
20 km 
 
 En. Fr. disc. En. Fr. disc. En. Fr. disc. 
                   
Temp. (° celsius) 22.27 23.27 -0.02 23.43 23.62 -0.55 22.90 21.44 0.68 
 
  (0.65)   (0.95)   (1.88) 
 
  [-1.25, 1.67]   [-3.00, 1.17]   [-5.17, 5.65] 
Monthly prec. (mm) 196 193 -4 227 229 -8 214 190 13 
   (9)   (9)   (11) 
 
  [-24, 16]   [-32, 13]   [-11, 41] 
Elevation (m) 968 813 28 650 637 297 756 1124 -155 
   (130)   (200)   (409) 
 
  [-314, 282]   [-121, 816]   [-1172, 1128] 
Slope (degrees) 9.57 5.99 1.90 7.70 5.91 2.18* 7.85 7.44 -0.68 
 
  (1.22)   (1.27)   (3.50) 
 
  [-1.24, 4.43]   [-0.89, 5.06]   [-11.20, 11.48] 
Agr. suitability 5.73 5.32 0.06 5.59 6.66 0.11 5.59 6.05 -0.64 
 
  (0.30)   (0.27)   (0.68) 
 
  [-0.70, 0.69]   [-0.41, 0.86]   [-2.53, 2.04] 
Malaria index 11.10 10.85 -0.92 15.32 15.45 -2.01 10.16 10.65 -4.13 
 
  (1.11)   (1.31)   (4.98) 
 
  [-3.71, 1.45]   [-5.00, 0.87]   [-16.12, 6.93] 
          
Observations 128 127 4,611 19,443 36,687 129,633 50,259 75,143 438,590 
 
Notes: in columns (1) to (3), the unit of observation is the 10 × 10 pixel. Robust standard errors in parentheses. In columns (4) to 
(6), the sample is the same as for results using 1976 census data: men older than 15 born in villages within 100 km of the southern 
section of the border (section 2). Geographical variables are at the level of the village of birth. Standard errors clustered by village 
in parentheses. In columns (7) to (9), the sample is the same as for results using 2005 census data: all individuals older than 15 
excluding those born in Douala and in districts closest to the northernmost section of the border (section 4). Geographical variables 
are at the level of the district of birth. Standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. *𝑝 < 0.1, **𝑝 < 0.05, ***𝑝 < 0.01. 
Discontinuities obtained employing a local linear non-parametric estimation with triangular kernel and optimal mean squared 
error bandwidth. Robust Calonico et al. (2014) confidence interval in [ ]. The choice to present averages within 30, 15 and 20 km of 
the border is guided by the average optimal MSE bandwidth for estimating discontinuities: 33.9 km in column (3), 14.7 km in column 
(6), and 17.51 km in column (9). Sources: temperature and monthly precipitation from WorldClim (http://www.worldclim.org). 
Temperature is average temperature over 1950–2000, precipitation is average monthly precipitation over 1950–2000. Elevation data 
from NASA Shuttle Radar Topography Mission, available on the CIAT-CSI SRTM website (http://srtm.csi.cgiar.org). 
Slope computed from the elevation data using the slope tool in ArcGIS. Agricultural suitability is suitability for rainfed crops 
excluding forest ecosystems, from Global Agro-Ecological Zones 
(http://webarchive.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm). Malaria stability index from Kiszweski et al. (2004), 
downloaded on https://sites.google.com/site/gordoncmccord//datasets. 
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Table 2 — Decomposition of the discontinuity in education into different margins 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Years of 
schooling 
Ever been to 
school 
Completed 
primary 
Completed 
secondary 
 
Men born 1922–1931 
Discontinuity 1.184*** 0.129** 0.102*** 0.013** 
 (0.377) (0.059) (0.038) (0.006) 
 [0.48, 2.20] [0.03, 0.28] [0.03, 0.20] [0.00, 0.03] 
Mean dep. var. 2.430 0.467 0.178 0.013 
Observations (effective) 4,981 4,084 5,173 7,516 
Observations (total) 15,368 15,404 15,368 15,368 
     
 Men born 1942–1951 
Discontinuity 0.140 -0.025 -0.042 0.059*** 
 (0.372) (0.034) (0.056) (0.02) 
 [-0.62, 1.03] [-0.09, 0.06] [-0.15, 0.09] [0.02, 0.10] 
Mean dep. var. 6.249 0.853 0.628 0.052 
Observations (effective) 5,822 7,213 6,106 5,938 
Observations (total) 26,913 27,048 26,913 26,913 
 
Notes: sample of men born in villages within 100 km of the southern section of the border. Discontinuities obtained employing 
a local linear non-parametric estimation with triangular kernel and optimal mean squared error bandwidth. Added covariates: 
ethnic homeland fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. *𝑝 < 0.1, **𝑝 < 0.05, ***𝑝 <
0.01. Calonico et al. (2014) confidence interval in [ ]. The effective number of observations is the number of observations 
within the optimal bandwidth. 
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Table 3 — Discontinuities in education in the 2005 census 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ever been to 
school 
Completed 
primary 
Completed 
secondary 
≥3 years of 
higher ed. 
≥ 15 years 
in school 
High-skilled 
occupation 
 Born 1971–1980 
Discontinuity -0.104* -0.078 0.095** 0.105*** 0.102** 0.019 
 (0.056) (0.080) (0.043) (0.029) (0.047) (0.022) 
 [-0.26, 0.01] [-0.29, 0.13] [0.02, 0.22] [0.05, 0.20] [0.01, 0.23] [-0.04, 0.08] 
Mean dep. var. 0.904 0.834 0.213 0.129 0.218 0.086 
Observations (effective) 40,054 38,636 31,808 31,808 31,808 18,786 
Observations (total) 106,762 106,762 106,762 106,762 106,762 54,142 
       
 Born 1981–1990 
Discontinuity -0.027 0.036 0.076** 0.025*** 0.107** 0.013* 
 (0.027) (0.036) (0.033) (0.006) (0.044) (0.007) 
 [-0.10, 0.04] [-0.03, 0.15] [0.02, 0.18] [0.01, 0.05] [0.01, 0.23] [-0.00, 0.03] 
Mean dep. var. 0.931 0.865 0.193 0.034 0.201 0.016 
Observations (effective) 48,03 39,178 39,178 34,984 39,178 12,15 
Observations (total) 153,817 153,817 153,817 153,817 153,817 34,951 
 
Notes: the sample excludes individuals born in Douala and born in districts closest to the northernmost section of the border. 
Discontinuities obtained employing a local linear non-parametric estimation with triangular kernel and optimal mean squared 
error bandwidth. Added covariates: border section dummies. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *𝑝 <
0.1, **𝑝 < 0.05, ***𝑝 < 0.01. Calonico et al. (2014) confidence interval in [ ]. The effective number of observations is the 
number of observations within the optimal bandwidth. 
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Table 4 — Discontinuities in wealth in the 1976 census 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Wealth 
index 
Private wealth 
index 
Public wealth 
index 
Access to 
piped water 
Electricity 
 Household heads residing close to the border 
Discontinuity 0.83*** 0.74*** 0.51*** 0.41*** 0.07** 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.03) 
 [0.55, 1.17] [0.46, 1.14] [0.28, 0.86] [0.07, 0.70] [0.01, 0.13] 
Mean dep. var. 0.56 0.48 0.50 0.38 0.07 
Observations (effective) 22,582 38,246 37,953 41,856 32,869 
Observations (total) 138,395 138,403 138,415 138,395 138,395 
      
 Household heads born close to the border 
Discontinuity 0.31*** 0.09 0.39*** 0.22*** 0.01 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.02) 
 [0.14, 0.58] [-0.06, 0.36] [0.25, 0.62] [0.07, 0.42] [-0.03, 0.06] 
Mean dep. var. 0.58 0.49 0.46 0.42 0.10 
Observations (effective) 16,477 16,656 24,421 24,706 16,656 
Observations (total) 81,682 81,689 81,696 81,682 81,682 
 
Notes: sample of household heads (all cohorts) residing in or born in villages within 100 km of the southern section of the 
border. Discontinuities obtained employing a local linear non-parametric estimation with triangular kernel and optimal mean 
squared error bandwidth. Added covariates: ethnic homeland fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the village level in 
parentheses. *𝑝 < 0.1, **𝑝 < 0.05, ***𝑝 < 0.01. Calonico et al. (2014) confidence interval in [ ]. The effective number of 
observations is the number of observations within the optimal bandwidth. The mean of the standardized wealth index is not 
zero because the sample is in the South, which is closer to the coast and richer. 
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Table 5 – Public financing of education, French and British Cameroon 
 
  1924 1930 1935 1937 1950 1955 
 Colonial government’s education expenditure  
per school-age child (1913 s.)(1)(2) 
French Cameroon 0.25 0.50 0.63 0.49 7.18 15.36 
British Cameroon 0.60 1.10 0.87 1.33 4.97 5.75 
 Public subsidies for private education  
per school-age child (1913 s.)(1)(2) 
French Cameroon 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 1.65 4.77 
British Cameroon 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.18 1.85 3.61        
 Total expenditure per capita (1913 £)
(2) 
French Cameroon 0.17 0.30 0.25 0.21 0.93 2.05(a) 
British Cameroon 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.43 0.47(a) 
       
 Share of education in total expenditure 
French Cameroon 1.49% 1.67% 2.56% 2.37% 7.74% 6.51%(a) 
British Cameroon 4.41% 6.83% 6.27% 7.71% 11.68% 8.36%(a) 
 
Sources: France, Ministère des Colonies (1921–1938, 1947–1957); Great Britain Colonial Office (1922–1938, 1949–1959). 
Colonial budgets were used as an additional source for French Cameroon (Cameroun, various dates). (1) School-age population 
is assumed to be 20% of total population. (2) British Cameroon figures were deflated to 1913 pounds using a UK retail price 
index (London and Cambridge Economic Service and Alford, 1973). French Cameroon figures were first deflated to 1913 francs 
using the French consumer price index of Villa (1997), and then converted to pounds using the 1913 official exchange rate (London 
and Cambridge Economic Service and Alford, 1973). 1913 was chosen because both countries were then in the gold standard 
and the exchange rate had been stable for decades. There are 20 shillings (s.) in a pound (£). (a) 1953 figures. 
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Table 6 — Discontinuities in various measures of economic development in 2005 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 A. Household-level measures of wealth 
 Wealth 
index 
Private 
wealth index 
Public wealth 
index 
Access to 
piped water 
Electricity 
 Household heads residing close to the border 
Discontinuity 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.21** -0.03 
 (0.26) (0.24) (0.24) (0.10) (0.12) 
 [-0.47, 0.97] [-0.42, 0.82] [-0.48, 0.91] [-0.07, 0.44] [-0.34, 0.34] 
Mean dep. var. 0.36 0.42 0.27 0.29 0.61 
Observations (effective) 32,582 33,168 27,450 33,200 27,450 
Observations (total) 123,534 123,534 123,566 123,566 123,566 
      
 Household heads born close to the border 
Discontinuity -0.25 -0.19 -0.24 0.12 -0.23 
 (0.36) (0.25) (0.38) (0.11) (0.18) 
 [-1.08, 0.80] [-0.79, 0.56] [-1.11, 0.88] [-0.11, 0.44] [-0.65, 0.30] 
Mean dep. var. 0.46 0.50 0.38 0.30 0.65 
Observations (effective) 58,672 58,672 57,478 57,478 57,478 
Observations (total) 156,399 156,399 156,433 156,433 156,433 
           
 B. District-level measures 
 
Night light 
per capita 
Urbanisation 
Share working 
in industry 
  
Discontinuity -0.18 -0.29** 0.01   
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.03)   
 [-0.43, 0.10] [-0.79, 0.03] [-0.08, 0.08]   
Mean dep. var. 0.22 0.31 0.07   
Observations (effective) 90 40 48   
Observations (total) 145 145 145     
 
Notes: the sample excludes Douala and the districts closest to the northernmost section of the border. Discontinuities obtained 
employing a local linear estimation with triangular kernel and optimal mean squared error bandwidth. Added covariates: border 
section dummies. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *𝑝 < 0.1, **𝑝 < 0.05, ***𝑝 < 0.01. Calonico 
et al. (2014) confidence interval in [ ]. The effective number of observations is the number of observations within the optimal 
bandwidth. Urbanization is the share of the district population living in an urban area. The industrial sector includes mining. 
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Table 7 — Discontinuities in repetition and learning outcomes in the 2005 census 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Has repeated  
≥ 1 grade 
Can read Can write 
Has repeated 
≥ 1 grade 
Discontinuity -0.20*** 0.00 0.01 -0.17*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
 [-0.30, -0.11] [-0.06, 0.07] [-0.05, 0.08] [-0.28,-0.06] 
Can read    -0.11*** 
    (0.03) 
Can write    -0.12*** 
    (0.03) 
Mean dep. var. 0.55 0.96 0.96 0.55 
Observations (effective) 46,970 5,314 5,314 21,427 
Observations (total) 182,697 15,487 15,487 84,192 
Sample 
All primary and 
secondary school 
students 
12-year-olds  
still in school 
All students 
older than 12 
 
Notes: the sample excludes individuals born in Douala and in districts closest to the northernmost section of the border. 
Discontinuities obtained employing a local linear non-parametric estimation with triangular kernel and optimal mean squared error 
bandwidth. Added covariates: border section dummies. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *𝑝 < 0.1, 
**𝑝 < 0.05, ***𝑝 < 0.01. Calonico et al. (2014) confidence interval in [ ]. A student is deemed to have repeated a grade if they 
are older than what their normal progression in the system would predict, given average school-entry age in the district (computed 
as the average age of students in their first year of schooling). 
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Table 8 — Discontinuities in secondary completion with controls, cohort 1981–1990 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Dependent variable: completed secondary 
Discontinuity 0.08** 0.07** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08** 0.08*** 0.08*** -0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) 
Secondary sch. in 
2000(a) 
 -0.18*        
  (0.09)        
Wealth cohort  
1951–60(b) 
  0.05***       
   (0.02)       
Education cohort 
1951–60(c) 
   0.02***      
    (0.00)      
Protestant(d)     -0.00     
     (0.01)     
District urbanization 
rate(e) 
     0.08*    
      (0.04)    
District literacy rate(g)       0.44***  0.35*** 
       (0.10)  (0.12) 
District share of 
repeaters(f) 
       -0.43*** -0.17 
        (0.14) (0.16) 
Observations 
(effective) 
38,179 38,179 38,179 38,179 37,516 38,179 38,179 38,179 38,179 
Observations (total) 153,817 153,817 153,817 153,817 150,9 153,817 153,817 153,817 153,817 
 
Notes: the sample excludes individuals born in Douala and born in districts closest to the northernmost section of the border. 
Discontinuities obtained employing a local linear non-parametric estimation with triangular kernel and optimal mean squared 
error bandwidth. Added covariates: border section dummies. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *𝑝 <
0.1, **𝑝 < 0.05, ***𝑝 < 0.01.. The effective number of observations is the number of observations within the optimal 
bandwidth. (a) Number of secondary schools per 100 secondary school age children in the district in 2000. (b) District average 
wealth index of household whose head was born between 1951 and 1960. (c) District average years of schooling of the cohort 
born between 1951 and 1960. (d) Protestants comprise other Christians, who are neither Protestant, nor Catholics, nor Orthodox. 
(e) District urbanization rate in 2005. (f) Share of middle school students who are older than what their normal progression 
through the system would predict (in 2005). (g) Share of the cohort born 1981–90 who can write in the 2005 census. 
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Figure 1 — The Evolution of Cameroon’s boundaries 
 
Sources: author’s map from Gifford and Louis (1967, 1971). 
 
 
Figure 2 — Localization of villages in the 1976 population census 
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Figure 3 — Ethnic groups in West Cameroon according to Murdock’s map 
 
Sources: Murdock (1959), map digitized by Nathan Nunn: http://scholar.harvard.edu/nunn/pages/data-0. 
Location of rivers from the Forest Atlas of Cameroon: https://cmr.forest-atlas.org/ 
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Figure 4 — Schools in German Cameroon in 1911 
 
Source: Schlunk (1914), geolocated by the author. 
 
Figure 5 — Discontinuities in male years of schooling in 1976 (southern section) 
 
Notes: Sample of men born in villages within 100 km of the southern section of the border. Discontinuities obtained employing 
a local linear non-parametric estimation with triangular kernel and optimal MSE bandwidth. Added covariates: ethnic homeland 
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the village level. 
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Figure 6 — Discontinuities in education in 2005 
 
Notes: the sample excludes individuals born in Douala and in districts closest to the northernmost section of the border. 
Discontinuities obtained employing a local linear non-parametric estimation with triangular kernel and optimal MSE bandwidth. 
Added covariates: border section dummies. Standard errors clustered at the district level. 
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Figure 7 — Border discontinuities in school supply over the 20th century 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of primary/secondary, public/private schools per 100 school-age children (6-11 
for primary, 12-18 for secondary). The unit of observation is the district (2005 boundaries). Douala is excluded. Discontinuities 
are obtained employing a local linear non-parametric estimation with triangular kernel and optimal MSE bandwidth. Added 
covariates: border section dummies.
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French and British Colonial Legacies in Education: 
Evidence from the Partition of Cameroon 
 
Online Appendix 
 
Yannick Dupraz 
A Data appendix 
A.1 Population census data 
Source and data quality. I obtained the full 1976 population census from the Cameroonian 
National Statistical Institute via the MIMADEM project.34 For 2005, I use a representative 10% 
extract made available by IPUMS International.35 For the 1976 census, I had to identify and 
eliminate a lot of duplicate observations, all located in the Anglophone part. I do not know 
whether these duplicates were the result of an error during the coding process or an attempt to 
inflate population figures in certain districts. 
Geolocation. I recovered the geographic coordinates of each village from its name using 
the website of the Cameroonian Ministry of Energy and Water (http://www.mng-
cameroon.org/SIG/). When I could not locate a village, I inferred its coordinates by taking the 
mean of villages in the same canton (a group of about 10 villages). In the 1976 census, in part of 
                                                 
34 Migrations, Marché du Travail et Dynamiques Démographiques en Afrique Subsaharienne, financed by the 
Hewlett Foundation, the AIRD (Agence Inter-établissement de la Recherche pour le Développement) and the 
AFD (Agence Française pour le Développement) 
35 Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: https://international.ipums.org/ 
international/ 
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the Francophone Ouest region, I could not geolocate villages.36 2005 census data cannot be 
geolocated more precisely than the district level. 
School attainment variables. Census data give information on the last grade attended, 
from which I construct a measure of effective years of schooling (the theoretical number of years 
needed to attain the last grade attended and a standard measure of human capital). This measure 
takes into account the fact that, in 2005 as in 1976, the length of the primary cycle was 7 years 
in the Anglophone system versus 6 years in the Francophone system.37 However, primary-cycle 
length varied through time within French and British Cameroon, something the population census 
does not reflect.38 For that reason, I also consider the intensive margins on school participation 
(whether an individual has ever been to school) and school attainment variables (completion of the 
primary and secondary cycles).39 Because of differences in repetition rates (higher in the 
Francophone system), effective years of schooling need not translate into the same number of 
years actually spent in school. Using 2002–2003 data on the percentage of repeaters in each 
grade by region, gender, system (Francophone versus Anglophone) and order of schooling (general 
                                                 
36 Codes given in the raw census data and in the village file do not match (census village codes very likely 
correspond to the chiefdom rather than the village). 
37 The census asks whether the last grade attended was in the Francophone or Anglophone system, and I 
assume that individuals did their entire education within the same system. For instance, an individual who stopped 
school in the second grade of secondary school will be assigned 8 (6+2) years of schooling in the Francophone 
system and 9 (7+2) years of schooling in the Anglophone system. 
38 The census gives a choice between only 6 grades in the Francophone system and 7 in the Anglophone one, 
however, in the Anglophone system, the primary cycle was 9 years long up to 1931, 8 years long from 1931 to 
1967 and 7 years long from 1967 onwards. In the Francophone system, the primary cycle has always been 6 years 
long, but a lot of mission schools used to lengthen the cycle by offering beginners’ classes. 
39 School participation includes Koranic schools, but omitting them does not affect results, especially 
because they were well developed only across the northernmost part of the border. 
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versus vocational), I construct a measure of years spent in school by adding to each effective year 
of schooling the region-grade specific repetition rate. If the repetition rate in grade 1 is 25%, 
pupils will spend on average 1.25 years in grade 1. Since I consider this measure when studying 
the cohort born between 1971 and 1980, I assume that repetition rates did not vary much between 
the 1980s and 2002, and that they were similar across districts of the same region (there were 10 
regions in Cameroon in 2005). 
Skill content of occupation. In 2005, I build a binary for having a high-skilled occupation 
(given one is working). High-skilled occupations are executive, manager, scientist/researcher, 
teacher/professor, engineer, physician, senior nurse or midwife, legal professional, writer/artist, 
or a member of the clergy. These are occupations having codes between 100 and 299 in the 
IPUMS dataset. 
Grade repetition. In 2005, I construct a measure of grade repetition for students still in 
school (primary and secondary). A student is deemed to have repeated a grade if they are older 
than what their normal progression in the system would predict, taking into account across-district 
differences in school entry age. For each individual i in district d, I observe age aid  and effective 
years of education yid. I compute, for each district d, the average primary school starting age sd  as 
the average age of individuals who are still in their first year of primary school. An individual is 
then considered to have repeated a grade if aid  − sd  >  yid. 
Wealth index and public utilities. I use information on house quality to build a wealth 
index for each household using the first component of a principal component analysis. The 
variables used are wall, roof and floor material, number of rooms per resident, type of toilet, light 
and drinking water sources, and, in 2005 only, type of lodging, cooking energy source, waste and 
waste water disposal systems, and accessibility. The wealth index is normalized to have zero 
mean and unit variance. I also decompose the index into a public and a private wealth index. 
The public wealth index uses housing quality variables which are strongly dependent on public 
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utilities (drinking water, light and cooking energy sources, type of toilet, waste water disposal 
system, and accessibility), while the private wealth index uses all other variables. I also build two 
public utilities binary variables: a binary equal to one if the household’s source of drinking 
water is piped water (in the dwelling or via a public fountain), and a binary equal to one if the 
household’s source of light is electricity. 
A.2 Geographic data 
Temperature and precipitation. I use gridded temperature and precipitation data from 
WorldClim (http://www.worldclim.org). Temperature is average temperature over 1950–
2000, precipitation is average monthly precipitation over 1950–2000. 
Elevation and slope. I use gridded elevation data from NASA Shuttle Radar Topography 
Mission, available on the CIAT-CSI SRTM website (http://srtm.csi.cgiar.org). I 
compute slope from the elevation data using the slope tool in ArcGIS. 
Malaria stability index.  I use the malaria stability index of Kiszweski et al. (2004)  to 
proxy for the prevalence of malaria. The gridded data was downloaded from 
https://sites.google.com/site/gordoncmccord//datasets. 
Agricultural suitability. I use gridded data on suitability for rainfed crops excluding 
forest ecosystems from Gobal Agro-Ecological Zones (http://webarchive.iiasa.ac. 
at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm). It is an index going from 0 (low suitability) to 11(high 
suitability). 
Night-time light. I use gridded data on light intensity at night in 2005 from Version 4 
DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Time Series: https://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/ 
downloadV4composites.html. I use ArcGIS to compute average pixel night-time light per 
district, and then multiply by the number of pixels in the district and divide by 2005 population to 
obtain night-time light per capita. 
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A.3 Historical data 
German schools. Schlunk (1914) gives the full list of missionary and government 
primary and secondary schools in Cameroon in 1911 (p. 85-113). From the name of the locality 
(Schulort), I recovered the latitude and longitude of each school using historical maps available on 
the Basel Mission Archives website (http://www.bmarchives.org) and the map available on 
the website of the Cameroonian Ministry of Energy and Water (http://www.mng-
cameroon.org/SIG/). I was able to geolocate 84% of schools in Schlunk (1914) (92% if we 
exclude the district or Bezirk of Edea, far from the border). Non-located schools were given the 
geographic coordinates of their mission stations (all government schools were located). 
Public finance data. I built series on colonial public expenditure (total expenditure and 
expenditure on education, discerning subsidies to the private sector) from the annual reports sent by 
both colonial powers to the League of Nations — the United Nations after World War II (France, 
Ministère des Colonies, 1921–1938, 1947–1957; Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1922–1938, 
1949–1959), as well as French Cameroon’s budget estimates (Cameroun, various dates). 
A.4 Measures of historical school supply per district 
To build measures of primary and secondary school supply per district at various dates, I use 
recent administrative school databases (from 2003 for primary schools, 2015 for secondary 
schools) giving the date of opening and status of every school in Cameroon. Assuming that few 
schools closed between their opening and today, I compute the number of schools per district at each 
date before using census data to divide by the corresponding school age population (6–11 for 
primary, 12–18 for secondary). 
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B Additional maps and figures 
 
Figure B.1 — Evidence of age heaping in the 1976 and 2005 censuses 
 
Figure B.2 — Districts in the 2005 population census 
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Figure B.3 — Ethnic groups in West Cameroon 
 
Sources: Location of groups from population maps established by the Office de la recherche scientifique et technique outre-mer 
(ORSTOM) in the 1970s (ORSTOM, Atlas Régional du Cameroun). Definition of ethnic groups (“groups of essentially identical 
languages and culture”) from Murdock (1959). The “tribes’’ represented on the ORSTOM maps are alternatively tribes, 
chiefdoms, or ethnolinguistic groups — for example, the Bamilékés are represented as a single tribe, when this group is composed of 
several chiefdoms; the chiefdoms of Bangwa and Mundani, which are part of the Bamiléké group according to Murdock (1959) 
and Ngoh (1987), are represented as separate “tribes.” 
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C Additional balance tests 
Table C.1 — Absence of discontinuity in the density of 1911 German schools 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 10x10 km pixels 1976 village-level sample 2005 district-level sample 
 Mean within 
30 km 
 Mean within  
15 km 
 Mean within  
20 km 
 
 En. Fr. disc. En. Fr. disc. En. Fr. disc. 
# German schools 0,44 0.98 -0.11 1.46 1.81 0.43 5.81 2.88 0.75 
   (0.39)   (0.51)   (5.31) 
   [-0.86, 1.00]   [-0.63, 1.68]   [-12.40, 14.82] 
Observations 128 127 4,611 19,443 36,687 129,633 50,259 75,143 438,59 
 
Notes: in columns (1) to (3), the unit of observation is the 10 × 10 pixel. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is the number of 1911 German schools per pixel. In columns (4) to (6), the sample is the same as for results using 1976 
census data: men older than 15 born in villages within 100 km of the southern section of the border (section 2). The dependent 
variable is the number of 1911 German schools within 5 km of the village. Standard errors clustered by village in parentheses. 
In columns (7) to (9), the sample is the same as for results using 2005 census data: all individuals older than 15 excluding those 
born in Douala and in districts closest to the northernmost section of the border (section 4). The dependent variable is the number 
of 1911 German schools per 2005 district. Standard errors clustered by district in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***<
0.01. Discontinuities obtained employing a local linear non-parametric estimation with triangular kernel and optimal mean 
squared error bandwidth. Robust Calonico et al. (2014) confidence interval in [ ]. Sources: Schlunk (1914). 
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Figure C.1 — McCrary tests for absence of discontinuity in density 
 
Notes: The sample is the same as for the main results of the paper (figure 5 and table 2), which means discontinuities are 
estimated on border section 2 on figure 2. Bin size: 500 meters. Local linear fit with a triangular kernel and a 5 km bandwidth. 
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D 1976 results: graphical representation and robustness 
D.1 1976 results: graphical representation 
Figure D.1 — Graphical representation of 1976 discontinuities 
 
Notes: The outcome variable is first regressed on the covariates (ethnic homeland fixed effects). Then each panel graphs the 
average value of the residuals for each 0.5 km bin on both sides of the border. The line on either side is fitted on observations 
collapsed by village (to take clustering into account). Distances are negative on the British side and positive on the French side 
and the border corresponds to a distance of zero. These graphs do not correspond directly to the nonparametric RD results, which 
use an optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel. 
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D.2 1976 results: robustness to other specifications 
Table D.1 — Discontinuities in education in 1976: robustness to latitude-longitude 
specifications 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 means on sample estimated discontinuities 
 within <5 km of border <5 km from border <10 km from border 
 British side French side 
(x,y) poly 
of degree 
1 
(x,y) poly 
of degree 
2 
(x,y) poly 
of degree 
1 
(x,y) poly 
of degree 
2 
 Men born 1922–1931 
Years of education 2.89 1.98 1.13*** 1.19*** 1.24*** 1.25*** 
   (0.22) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
   [0.23] [0.19] [0.24] [0.23] 
Observations 1,110 686 1,796 1,796 3,205 3,205 
       
 Men born 1942–1951 
Years of education 6.50 6.89 0.35** 0.21 0.26* 0.20 
   (0.17) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) 
   [0.17] [0.14] [0.18] [0.17] 
Observations 1,780 1,216 2,996 2,996 6,400 6,400 
       
# of villages 65 45 110 110 195 195 
 
Notes: sample of men born close to the southern section of the border. All regressions control for ethnic homeland fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered by village in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***< 0.01. Conley standard errors in [ ] (cut-off 
window of 20 kms). 
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D.3 1976 results: placebo borders 
Figure D.2. — Placebo borders for 1976 results 
 
Notes: this graph displays the distribution of discontinuities estimated on placebo borders running parallel to the actual border, 
but shifted East or West by up to 50 km in steps of 1 km.  The solid line shows the discontinuity estimated at the actual border.  
The p-value for a two-sided test is simply the percentage of placebo discontinuities whose absolute value is larger than the 
absolute value of the actual discontinuity. 
D.4 Selection by mortality 
Estimating results on different age groups observed at the same point in time creates the 
concern of potential selection by mortality, a problem similar to selective attrition. This is mostly 
a concern for the emergence of a British advantage in education after the partition of Cameroon, 
a result obtained on cohorts born between 1912 and 1931. In the census, I only observe the 
members of this cohort who survived up to 1976, when they were between 45 and 65 years old. 
We have to consider two types of mortality: peacetime mortality and mortality during the 
independence war. Peacetime mortality likely selects the poorest and least educated: it could 
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explain the positive British effect for older cohorts if mortality was higher in British Cameroon 
than in French Cameroon. However, the only study comparing health systems in colonial 
Cameroon concludes it was better in the British part (Nzima Nzima, 2014).40 Moreover, if life 
expectancy was lower in British Cameroon, we would expect the age pyramid to be thinner at 
the top on the British side. To check that it is not the case, I estimate discontinuities in the share 
of each cohort in total population. Figure D.3 shows that, though age pyramids are roughly 
similar on either side of the border, the share of men aged 45–54 (born 1922–1931) is about 6 
percentage points larger on the British side, while the share of men aged 35–44 (born 1932–
1941) about 8 percentage points smaller on the British side. However, I estimate a large and 
positive discontinuity in years of schooling for both of these cohorts, as well as for the cohort 
born 1912–1921, which is the same size on each side. It is therefore unlikely that my results are 
explained by higher mortality in British Cameroon. 
Figure D.3 — Border discontinuities in cohort share of total population 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of each cohort in the total male population of a village. Sample of villages within 
100 km of the southern section of the border. Discontinuities obtained using a local linear non-parametric estimation with 
triangular kernel and optimal MSE bandwidth. Added covariates: ethnic homeland fixed effects. 
 
 
                                                 
40 Nzima Nzima (2014) writes that infant mortality rates were higher in French Cameroon than in British 
Cameroon in the 1920s. 
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What about wartime mortality? An estimated 100,000 to 200,000 people died during the 
independence war (Deltombe et al., 2011), which took place mostly in the French part. The 
conflict was most violent in the Bamiléké region, which is not part of my sample.41 For wartime 
mortality, the direction of selection is not obvious a priori. If wartime mortality selected the most 
educated, it could explain the positive British effect for older cohorts. It would be a concern 
mostly for the cohort born between 1932 and 1941, whose members were of fighting age during 
the most violent part of the conflict around 1960, but for this cohort, in my sample, the age 
pyramid is actually thicker on the French side (figure D.3). If wartime mortality selected the 
least educated, it could explain the convergence in education, but this convergence is also 
estimated for cohorts born after 1950, who did not take part in the conflict. 
D.5 Migration 
Within Cameroon migration. Using 1976 census data, figure D.4 gives a better idea of 
migration patterns in the border region (defined as districts within 25 km of the border). The first 
panel displays, on both sides of the border and in each cohort, the percentage of internal out-
migrants from the border region: people who were born close to the border region and moved 
away, but did not cross the border between French and British Cameroon. The second panel 
displays the percentage of internal in-migrants to the border region: people who were born away 
from the border but moved to the border region, without crossing the border. The third panel 
displays the percentage of cross-border out-migrants from the border region, and the fourth panel 
the percentage of cross-border in-migrants to the border region.42 
  
                                                 
41 I could not geolocate villages there, see figure 2. 
42 The census does not give an individual’s full migration history: a migrant is someone who lives in 1976 
in a different district than the one they were born in. 
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Figure D.4 – Internal and cross-border migration in the 1976 population census 
 
Notes: migrants are people whose district of residence in 1976 is different from their district of birth. Internal migrants still live 
on the side of the border they were born in. Internal out-migrants were born within 25 km of the border (Douala excluded) and 
live more than 25 km away from it in 1976. Internal in-migrants live within 25 km of the border in 1976 (Douala excluded) and 
were born more than 25 km away from it. 
 
Internal migration was overall more widespread than cross-border migration, which offers 
evidence that the border put in place by the colonizers had some reality for Cameroonians. Internal 
migration away from and to the border region was more widespread in French Cameroon, 
reflecting the fact that the French part was much larger than the British part, and offered more 
opportunity for migration. 
Cross-border migration was overall more limited, but there was migration from French 
Cameroon to British Cameroon, peaking for the cohort 1912–1921 in which about 9% of 
individuals living close to the border in British Cameroon had migrated from French Cameroon 
(last panel of figure D.4). Such migration perhaps reflects the higher wages offered by German-
owned plantations in British Cameroon (Le Vine, 1964). Migration from the British side of the 
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border to the French side was particularly important for people who became adults after 
reunification: almost 10% of individuals born close to the border in British Cameroon between 
1942 and 1961 lived in the former French part in 1976 (third panel of figure D.4). 
Because I conduct a border discontinuity on the place of birth of individuals, these 
migration patterns matter only insofar as they affect the parents’ generation. Higher internal 
migration in French Cameroon could explain the emergence of a positive British effect if, among 
the parents of those for whom I estimate a discontinuity, the ones with a high preference for 
education migrated away from the border region before their child was born, or the ones with a low 
preference for education migrated to the border regions. Internal migrants were on average more 
educated than those who stayed, making the second scenario unrealistic.43 As for the first one, 
differences in education preferences would need to be very large to explain the divergence in 
education. Even if out-migrants were giving their children 6 more years of education than those 
who stayed (an extreme assumption) the 4% difference in internal out-migration rates between 
French and British Cameroon for older cohorts (first panel of figure 6) would account for a 
difference of 6 ×  0.04 =  0.24 years of education only. 
Migration from French to British Cameroon could explain the emergence of a positive British 
effect if migrants from French Cameroon had a higher preference for education than locals, but 
this does not seem to have been the case: in the sample of men living in British Cameroon within 
25 km of the border and born before 1912, regressing years of schooling on district of residence 
fixed effects and a dummy equal to one if an individual was born in French Cameroon yields a 
coefficient of −0.05 (standard error clustered at the district level of 0.08). 
                                                 
43 In the sample of men living in French Cameroon within 25 km of the border and born before 1912, 
regressing years of schooling on district of residence fixed effects and a dummy equal to one if an individual was born 
away from the border region yields a coefficient of 1.75 (standard error clustered at the district level of 0.80). 
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When using 1976 census data, I repatriate migrants to their village of origin assuming 
constant migration rates across villages of the same district. Figure D.5 shows what happens 
to the discontinuities in years of schooling when we exclude out-of-district migrants completely 
rather than repatriating them: for the first 5 cohorts, results are virtually unchanged, but for the 
cohorts born after 1932, rather than falling to zero, the British effect remains positive and 
significant, which confirms that the higher migration rates in French Cameroon in these cohorts 
(first panel of figure D.4) selected away the more educated individuals. 
Figure D.5 — Discontinuities in 1976 with and without migrants 
 
Notes: this graph compares discontinuities obtained on the sample of all individuals (including out-of-district migrants 
reallocated in their village of birth), with border discontinuities estimated on the sample of those who remained in their district 
of birth. Sample of men born in villages within 100 km of the southern section of the border. Discontinuities obtained employing 
a local linear non-parametric estimation with triangular kernel and optimal MSE bandwidth. Added covariates: ethnic homeland 
fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the village level. 
 
Migration from/to Nigeria. During the mandate period, a number of Nigerians moved 
to British Cameroon, which was administered as part of Southeast Nigeria, to work in road 
construction, on plantations, and in the civil service. In the 1952/1953 census of Nigeria, 
Nigerian “tribes” represent 11% of the population of Southern British Cameroon (Great Britain, 
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Colonial Office, 1953).44 In the 1976 census, individuals born in Nigeria represent 6.5% of the 
population of the former British part. Again, individuals born in Nigeria are not actually the 
problem here as I conduct a border discontinuity on the place of birth of individuals, but the 
concern is that Nigerian migrants had a specific preference for educating their children born in 
Cameroon. In the 1976 census, I find that Nigerian migrants of the generation of the parents (born 
before 1912) were more educated that locals.45 To have an idea of the potential bias, we need to 
assume the percentage of Cameroon-born Nigerian-origins individuals in the relevant cohorts of 
the 1976 census. Assuming a figure of 5%, and assuming that Nigerian-born parents were giving 
their children 6 more years of education than locals (again, an extreme assumption), Nigerian 
migration would account for a British effect of 6 ×  0.05 =  0.3 years of education.46 
Another problem arises because a sizable number of Nigerians left Cameroon around 
reunification, as British Cameroonians pushed for an indigenization of the civil service and 
threatened to deport the Igbo migrants from southeastern Nigeria (Amaazee, 1990; Chem-
Langhee, 1976). Individuals born in Cameroon who went back to Nigeria after 1960 would not 
be observed in the 1976 census. In 1953, Nigerian “tribes” represented 84,200 individuals in 
Southern British Cameroon. In the 1976 census, in the same area, individuals born in Nigeria 
before 1953 represented 45,265 individuals. It does not mean that 40,000 Nigerians left Cameroon, 
                                                 
44 Nigerian “tribes” comprise both people born in Nigeria and their children. They are 84,200 for a total 
population of 752,700 in the 1953 census of the Southern British Cameroon (the part of British Cameroon that was 
then reunited with Francophone Cameroon). 
45 In the sample of men living in British Cameroon within 25 km of the border and born before 1912, 
regressing years of education on district of residence fixed effects and a dummy equal to one if an individual was 
born in Nigeria yields a coefficient of 0.58 (standard error clustered at the district level of 0.22). 
46 In the 1976 census, the percentage born in Nigeria in the generation of the parents (born before 1912) is 
about 2%. Assuming birth rates are roughly homogenous, the percentage of their Cameroon- born children in total 
population should not be too different. 5% seems like a reasonable upper-bound. 
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as the 1953 census counts people of Nigerian origins born in Cameroon while the 1976 does not, and 
as we need to take mortality into account. To construct an upper bound estimate of the bias, we can 
assume that the Nigerian-origins Cameroon-born individuals who left represented 5% of their 
cohort and that they had 6 more years of schooling than locals. The British effect would be 
underestimated by 0.05 ×  6 =  0.3 years of education. 
D.6 Replication of 1976 results at the district level 
A concern is that 2005 district-level results are not directly comparable to 1976 village- 
level results. One first problem is that they are not obtained on exactly the same border section 
(because some data cannot be geolocated at the village level in 1976, see figure 2). A second 
problem is that the geographical variation is not the same (village-level versus district-level 
variation). On figure D.6, I replicate 1976 results at the 1976 district of birth level. Because of 
district splitting between 1976 and 2005, the number of districts within 100 km of the border is 
much lower in 1976 than in 2005 (56 versus 115). To retain enough statistical power, I consider 
all districts within 100 km of the border (excluding Douala), and control for geographic location 
using a linear function of distance to the border whose slope is allowed to vary on either side. 
Figure D.6 replicates the village-level results of figure 5, though the positive British effect for 
cohorts born between 1912 and 1941 is smaller and imprecisely estimated. On figure D.7, to 
increase the number of districts, I assign each 1976 village to its 2005 district and run the RD 
analysis as if I only had geographical data at the level of the 2005 district. This allows me to 
estimate 1976 discontinuities using the same specification and sample (of districts) as for 2005 
results, excluding Douala and the northernmost border section.47 Figure D.7 replicates the 
village-level results of figure 5: men born between 1922 and 1941 have one more year of education 
                                                 
47 The number of districts is still smaller though because in the Ouest region I cannot geolocate villages 
beyond the 1976 district level (see figure 2). 
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if they were born on the British side of the border. The only difference is that I also estimate a 
positive border discontinuity of about 1 year for the cohort born 1942–1951, whereas I estimate 
no discontinuity when focusing on the southern border segment and using village-level 
variation. 
Figure D.6 — Discontinuities in male years of schooling in 1976, 1976-district-level 
specification 
 
Notes: Sample of men born in districts located within 100 km of the border. Discontinuities estimated by controlling for a linear 
function of distance to the border with a different slope on each side. Added covariates: border section dummies. Standard 
errors clustered at the district level. 
 
 
Figure D.7 — Discontinuities in male years of schooling in 1976, 2005-district-level 
specification 
 
Notes: the sample excludes individuals born in Douala and in districts closest to the northernmost section of the border. 
Discontinuities obtained employing a local linear non parametric estimation with triangular kernel and a 20 km bandwidth (the 
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bandwidth used to obtain the results of table 3 varies between 14 and 27 km). Added covariates: border section dummies. 
Standard errors clustered at the district level. 
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E 2005 results: robustness and graphical representation of results 
E.1 2005 results: graphical representation 
Figure E.1 — 2D visual representation of discontinuities in 2005 
 
Notes: The outcome variable is first regressed on the covariates (a border section dummy). Then each panel graphs the average 
value of the residuals for each 0.5 km bin on both sides of the border. The line on either side is fitted on observations collapsed 
by village (to take clustering into account). Distances are negative on the English-speaking side and positive on the French-
speaking side and the border corresponds to a distance of zero. These graphs do not correspond directly to the nonparametric 
RD results, which use an optimal bandwidth and a triangular kernel. 
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Figure E.2 — Maps of variables in the 2005 census 
 
Notes: the first three maps display the average of the variable of interest among individuals born in the district between 1971 
and 1980. The last map displays the percentage of students who have repeated at least a grade among students in primary and 
secondary school in the district. A student is deemed to have repeated a grade if they are older than what their normal progression 
in the system would predict, taking into account across-district differences in school entry age. 
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E.2 2005 results: robustness to other specifications and samples 
Table E.1 — Discontinuities in education in 2005: robustness to latitude-longitude 
specifications 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 means on sample estimated discontinuities 
 within <25 km of border <25 km of border <50 km of border <100 km of border 
 English-sp. 
side 
French-sp. 
side  
(x,y) poly 
of degree 1 
(x,y) poly 
of degree 2 
(x,y) poly 
of degree 1 
(x,y) poly 
of degree 2 
(x,y) poly 
of degree 1 
(x,y) poly 
of degree 2 
 Born 1971–1980 
Ever been to school 0.88 0.93 -0.07*** -0.13*** -0.06** -0.08*** -0.04 -0.04 
   (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] 
Completed primary 0.82 0.85 -0.08*** -0.12*** -0.05 -0.06* -0.03 -0.03 
   (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
   [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] 
Completed secondary 0.24 0.17 0.07*** 0.08** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
   (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] 
≥3 years of higher ed. 0.16 0.09 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
≥15 years spent in school 0.25 0.17 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
   (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
   [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] 
High-skilled 0.10 0.06 0.03** 0.04** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
   (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
   [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
         
 Born 1981–1990 
Ever been to school 0.92 0.94 -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.03* -0.04*** -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
   [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] 
Completed primary 0.86 0.87 -0.04** -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
   [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] 
Completed secondary 0.21 0.15 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
≥3 years of higher ed. 0.04 0.03 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
≥15 years spent in school 0.24 0.15 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
   (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
High-skilled 0.02 0.01 0.01*** 0.01 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
   (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
         
# of districts 16 20 36 36 60 60 86 86 
 
Notes: the sample excludes individuals born in Douala and born in districts closest to the northernmost section of the border. 
Added covariates: border section dummies. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, 
***< 0.01. Conley standard errors in [ ] (cut-off window of 20 kms). 
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Table E.2 — Discontinuities in education in the 2005 census estimated on the whole border 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ever been to 
school 
Completed 
primary 
Completed 
secondary 
≥3 years of 
higher ed. 
≥15 years in 
school 
High-skilled 
occupation 
 Born 1971–1980 
Discontinuity -0.006 -0.018 0.100** 0.087*** 0.116*** 0.026 
 (0.068) (0.079) (0.040) (0.031) (0.042) (0.020) 
 [-0.18, 0.19] [-0.24, 0.18] [0.04, 0.21] [0.01, 0.17] [0.06, 0.23] [-0.03, 0.08] 
Mean dep. var. 0.850 0.758 0.182 0.111 0.186 0.074 
Observations (effective) 33,104 39,594 33,104 39,594 33,104 20,310 
Observations (total) 161,323 161,323 161,323 161,323 161,323 83,047 
       
 Born 1981–1990 
Discontinuity 0.069** 0.098** 0.081*** 0.015** 0.100** 0.017** 
 (0.032) (0.050) (0.031) (0.007) (0.044) (0.008) 
 [0.01, 0.17] [0.02, 0.25] [0.01, 0.17] [-0.00, 0.03] [-0.02, 0.21] [0.00, 0.04] 
Mean dep. var. 0.886 0.797 0.165 0.029 0.172 0.013 
Observations (effective) 32,044 32,044 41,542 53,696 41,542 14,880 
Observations (total) 234,767 234,767 234,767 234,767 234,767 59,048 
 
Notes: the sample excludes individuals born in Douala and born in districts closest to the northernmost section of the border. 
Discontinuities obtained employing a local linear non-parametric estimation with triangular kernel and optimal mean squared 
error bandwidth. Added covariates: border section dummies. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *p <
0.1, **p < 0.05, ***< 0.01. Calonico et al. (2014) confidence interval in [ ]. The effective number of observations is the 
number of observations within the optimal bandwidth. 
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E.3 Placebo borders 
 
Figure E.3 — Placebo borders for 2005 results 
 
Notes: This graph displays the distribution of discontinuities estimated on placebo borders running parallel to the actual border,  
but shifted East by  up to 50 km and West  by  up to  25 km by steps of 1 km (the number of clusters quickly becomes small 
when the border is shifted West towards Anglophone Cameroon, which is why I limit the shift to 25 km). The solid line shows 
the discontinuity estimated at the actual border. The p-value for a two-sided test is simply the percentage of placebo 
discontinuities whose absolute value is larger than the absolute value of the actual discontinuity. 
  
27  
F Additional results on mechanisms 
Table F.1 — Discontinuities in male years of schooling with controls, cohort born 1922–1931 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Years of 
schooling 
Years of 
schooling 
Years of 
schooling 
Years of 
schooling 
Discontinuity 1.18*** 1.17*** 1.15*** 1.14*** 
 (0.38) (0.37) (0.35) (0.35) 
 [0.48, 2.20] [0.51, 2.19] [0.55, 2.15] [0.55,2.14] 
Within 5 km of a plantation  1.52*** -0.15 -0.16 
  (0.57) (0.67) (0.65) 
Within 10 km of a plantation  
 1.92*** 0.84 
   (0.53) (0.53) 
Within 15 km of a plantation    1.17*** 
    (0.33) 
Observations (effective) 4,981 4,981 4,981 4,981 
Observations (total) 15,368 15,368 15,368 15,368 
 
Notes: discontinuities obtained employing a local linear non-parametric estimation with triangular kernel and optimal mean 
squared error bandwidth. Added covariates: ethnic homeland fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the village level in 
parentheses. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***< 0.01. Calonico et al. (2014) confidence interval in [ ]. The effective number of 
observations is the number of observations within the optimal band- width. The controls are dummies equal to one if an individual 
was born in a village within x km of a German-owned plantation on the British side (the dummy is equal to zero on the French 
side). The list of German-owned plantations comes from Le Vine (1964). 
 
 
 
Table F.2 — Discontinuities in religion in the 2005 census 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Christian Protestant(a) Catholic Muslim Animist No religion 
Discontinuity 0.184*** 0.281 -0.115 -0.044* -0.044 -0.146*** 
 (0.052) (0.200) (0.193) (0.026) (0.051) (0.055) 
 [-0.01, 0.43] [-0.13, 0.89] [-0.65, 0.29] [-0.12, 0.01] [-0.14, 0.08] [-0.28, -0.03] 
Mean dep. var. 0.893 0.316 0.515 0.027 0.022 0.047 
Observations 
(effective) 
142,700 193,922 225,072 170,888 250,302 289,980 
Observations (total) 713,814 713,814 713,814 713,814 713,814 713,814 
 
Notes: the sample excludes individuals born in Douala and born in districts closest to the northernmost section of the border. 
Discontinuities obtained employing a local linear non-parametric estimation with triangular kernel and optimal mean squared error 
bandwidth. Added covariates: border section dummies. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. *p < 0.1, 
**p < 0.05, ***< 0.01. Calonico et al. (2014) confidence interval in [ ]. (a) Protestants comprise other Christians, who are 
neither Protestant, nor Catholics, nor Orthodox. 
 
 
 
